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With recent trends such as cloud computing and micro services modern software systems
become more and more decentralized. As a result more and more data processed by the
systems ows across public networks and environments hosted by third parties. With
recent legal regulations, such as the General Data Protection Regulations of the EU, it
becomes even more important for software developers to ensure that all data ows of
their software adhere to legal constraints. While several model-based approaches have
been proposed for modeling data ows and related constraints on architecture level their
automated analysis capabilities are limited. In many cases no automated analysis is
available or an analysis has to be implemented on a per-scenario basis.
We therefore propose a novel meta-model for modeling data ows of software systems.
Alongside we provide a translation transforming model instances to programs based on the
logic programming language Prolog. This combination allows to easily dene automated
analysis of software systems regarding data ow constraint violations. For the design and
implementation we ensure that our approach is ecient regarding the scalability. For this
purpose we introduce several techniques for optimizing Prolog programs which are not
only limited to our approach.
In addition we provide an extensive evaluation of our approach. Hereby we investigate
the accuracy, the scalability and the genericness of our approach. We show that our
approach is able to accurately analyse various types of scenarios while maintaining a
good scalability. We show that our proposed Prolog optimizations are eective as they




Aktuelle Entwicklungen in der Software-Technik zeigen einen Trend zur Dezentralisierung
von Software-Systemen. Mit dem Einsatz von Techniken wie Cloud-Computing oder Micro-
Services ießen immer mehr Daten über öentliche Netzwerke oder über die Infrastruktur
von Drittanbietern. Im Gegensatz dazu führen aktuelle gesetzliche Änderungen wie die
Datenschutz-Grundverordnung dazu, dass es für Software-Entwickler immer wichtiger wird
sicherzustellen, dass die Datenüsse ihrer Software gesetzliche Beschränkungen einhalten.
Um dies trotz der stetig wachsenden Komplexität von Software-Systemen zu ermöglichen
wurden verschiedene modellbasierte Ansätze auf Architekturebene vorgeschlagen. Ein
Nachteil der meisten Ansätze ist jedoch, dass sie oftmals keine voll automatisierte Analyse
bezüglich der Verletzung von Datenussbeschränkungen ermöglichen. Oft sind keine
automatisierten Analysen möglich oder Analysen müssen individuell für jedes Szenario
entwickelt werden.
Aus diesem Grund schlagen wir ein neues Metamodell zur Beschreibung der Datenüs-
sen von Softwaresystemen vor. Dieses Metamodell ist so entworfen, dass eine automati-
sierte übersetzung von Instanzen in ein Programm der logischen Programmiersprache
Prolog ermöglicht wird. Dieses Programm erlaubt dann die einfache Formulierung von
Regeln zur automatisierten Prüfung der Einhaltung von Datenussbeschränkungen. Ein
wichtiger Aspekt für den Entwurf und die Implementierung unseres Ansatzes ist die
Skalierbarkeit: Ziel ist es, sicherzustellen dass unser Ansatz ezient einsetzbar ist. Hierbei
haben wir insbesondere Techniken zur Optimierung von Prolog Programmen entwickelt,
deren Einsatzmöglichkeiten nicht nur auf unseren Ansatz beschränkt sind.
Desweiteren haben wir eine umfangreiche Evaluation unseres Ansatzes durchgeführt.
Hierbei haben wir die Genauigkeit, Skalierbarkeit sowie die Generizität unseres Ansatzes
untersucht. Wir haben gezeigt, dass unser Ansatz für mehrere Arten von Szenarien ge-
nau arbeitet und dabei eine gute Skalierbarkeit aufweist. Es hat sich herausgestellt, dass
unsere vorgestellten Optimierungen in manchen Fällen sogar zu einer Reduktion von
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In this chapter we provide a short introduction to the eld covered by this masters thesis.
First we motivate the problem this work attempts to solve. Afterwards we outline our
approach for solving it. Finally, an overview of the contents of this work is given in the
last section.
1.1. Motivation
Developing and maintaining modern software systems is becoming more and more dicult
due to their increased complexity. In addition to classic functional and quality require-
ments, such as performance, the number of data ow and security related requirements
steadily grows. Decentralized applications commonly make use of modern technologies
and paradigms, such as distributed micro services or cloud computing. Due to the de-
centralization of the software resulting from these approaches, the data ow via public
networks increases inherently. This however conicts with the increasing privacy and
security related requirements posed to software systems. With recent legal regulations,
such as the General Data Protection Regulations of the European Union [8] which came
into force in mid 2018 this is becoming even more important. Companies not conforming
to the required privacy and security standards risk being ned high charges.
In order to aid software developers with meeting the imposed data ow requirements
several approaches have been proposed. Many of such approaches try to uncover potential
security issues by performing automated analyses through the inspection of the source
code. This way, formal verication tools can help ensuring security requirements such
as non-inference [28]. However, such source code based approaches often operate on a
very ne-granular level which can impose a high manual overhead for certain security
analyses.
In contrast model based approaches on architecture level try to minimize the manual
eorts required by performing analyses on a higher abstraction level. In addition such
approaches often can already be applied at design time and therefore can uncover issues
prior to the implementation. Many such approaches enhance existing models used during
development and maintenance with data ow and security related information. An example
for such an approach is UMLSec [16] which provides an extension to the UML meta
model [20]. As these UML models are still code-centric, an extension of the Palladio
Component Model [27] has been proposed for modeling these concerns on architecture
level. Both approaches provide the means to specify data ow requirements and constraints
in an intuitive manner for developers. This however comes with the downside that the
corresponding model elements contain much scenario specic semantic information. For
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this reason, an automated evaluation of data ow constraints is only partially possible or
requires per-usecase specialized analysis tools.
1.2. Contribution
The goal of this thesis is to ease the evaluation of data ow constraints based on models
at architecture level. While there are several approaches for enhancing models with
information about data ows, their automatic analysis capabilities are currently limited.
In this thesis we propose a model which allows an easy formulation of automated data
ow constraint analyses based on the logic programming language Prolog [3]. This model
is designed to have a concretely specied semantic which is easily understandable by
machines. In addition we provide a translator for transforming model instances to Prolog
programs. We chose logic programming for performing the analysis as it removes the
burden of having to implement an analysis algorithm. Instead logic programming allows
us to focus solely on the analysis logic in this thesis. As logic programming language
we decided to use Prolog as it is very wide spread and oers a wide range of features.
In our work we design a Prolog API for the easy formulation of constraints. This API is
exposed by programs generated through our approach. Through this API the resulting
Prolog representation of the system allows an automated ad-hoc analysis using queries
based on Prolog terms. As a result of this analysis, our approach will either verify that all
constraints are held or it will provide sample call traces which lead to constraint violations.
The meta model we propose is not designed for allowing an intuitive manual denition
of the system. Instead we designed it so that in future work models of existing approaches,
such as the data ow extension of Palladio [27], can be translated into our proposed model.
The process of this translation is expected to remove implicit semantic information by
translating it into explicit requirements understandable by a machine.
For the design of our approach a central aim is to maximize the performance of both
the translation to a logical program as well as the evaluation of the resulting program.
Hereby, we propose and analyse Prolog optimization patterns for an ecient mapping
of concepts such as parameter passing and stack management to logical programs. We
provide an extensive evaluation of the performance of the overall approach as well as of
the eectiveness of the proposed optimizations.
1.3. Overview
In Chapter 2 we start with an introduction to the concepts required for the understanding
of this thesis. Afterwards in Chapter 3 we dene the two main data ow constraint analysis
scenarios on which we focus for the design of our approach. Next in Chapter 4 we outline
related work. We introduce our proposed meta model in Chapter 5 and the corresponding
translation to Prolog code in Chapter 6. In Chapter 7 we show our proposed performance
optimization for Prolog. Afterwards we experimentally evaluate our approach in Chapter 8.




In this chapter we briey introduce the concepts required for the understanding of this
thesis. In Section 2.1 we give a short introduction to the eld of software modeling. After-
wards in Section 2.2 we outline the key concepts and properties of the logic programming
language Prolog.
2.1. Soware Modeling
In software engineering, models are often used as an abstraction of software. Hereby, the
elements of which such model instances are built are itself dened in models, which are
called meta models. An example for a set of software meta models is the Unied Modeling
Language (UML) [20]. While models are often used for the design, documentation and
communication during the development of software systems, they also enable analysis in
order to predict properties of the system, such as the performance or condentiality.
Data ow models are commonly used to formalize how information ows through a
software system. In the proposed thesis we will use the terminology and model proposed
by Seifermann et al. [27]. In this terminology, a data ow typically consists of a source, a
set of processing operations and a sink. Sources produce information, for instance by Users
entering personal information. This information ows through the system where it is
possibly accessed and modied, which is modeled by the processing operations. Finally,
the information leaves the system, for example in form of a web page or as record in a
database. This is represented in the model by sinks. Note that the set of sources and sinks
does not have to be disjoint, for example a database can serve as a sink as well as a source.
In previous work [27] an extension for the Palladio Component Model [23] has been
proposed for enriching PCM models with data ow information with low manual eort.
The core idea is to enrich component methods with specialized data-ow-SEFFs. These
SEFFs describe which information is transferred via method parameters and return values
as well as how the information is modied. Therefore, the complete ow of information
with sources, sinks and processing operations can be derived by combining the data-ow-
SEFFs with the assembly model of the modeled system.
2.2. Prolog
Our proposed data ow analysis tool performs its analysis based on the logic programming
language Prolog [3]. For this reason we rst introduce the basic concepts of this language
in Section 2.2.1. In the section afterwards we explain more advanced language and im-
plementation details. These are required for understanding our proposed performance




Logic programming is an alternative programming paradigm to the classic procedural
programming. In classic procedural programming languages, a program consists of a
set of statements, which are executed one after another. There the developer inuences
the execution order with control structures, such as loops or if clauses. The processed
information typically is stored in variables.
Logic programming is fundamentally dierent. Instead of specifying statements in their
execution order, a logic program consists of a list of facts and rules. Based on only these
data sets, a solver for the logical program can decide whether a specied goal can be
proven or not. Note that in contrast to structural programming, the solver is capable of
doing so without the need of the program to specify an algorithm on how the solver nds
the proof. Details on the dierentiation between structural and logic programming can be
found in the work of Kowalski [19]. An example for facts in Prolog is given below:
owner ( hans , bmw ) .
owner ( l i s a , f o r d ) .
This examples states that hans owns a bmw and that lisa owns a ford. Hereby hans, bmw,
lisa and ford are called Atoms. Atoms are the objects your program species logical rules
for. Facts can be seen as special rules, which specify that a given fact is true.
Based on a fact base, now it is possible to specify rules, such as the following:
ownsCar (X) : − owner ( X , _ ) .
This rule reads as “given that X owns the car _, then X in general owns a car”. Hereby,
X and _ are variables. The underscore _ is an anonymous variable. With the facts and
rules specied, the logic program can now already be used for deduction. System prompts
can be used to query the fact base. In this work we use the syntax of SWI-Prolog [29]
where prompts are started with the symbols “-?”. For example, executing the following
system prompts will yield the results shown beneath them:
?−owner ( l i s a , f o r d ) .
true .
?−owner ( l i s a , bmw ) .
f a l s e .
?−ownsCar ( l i s a ) .
true .
The rst prompt is true, as there is a fact exactly specifying that lisa owns a ford. The
second one is false, as there is no fact or rule, with which it can be proven that lisa owns a
bmw. The third examples evaluates to true, as the Prolog implementation is capable of
deducing ownsCar based on its facts. By setting X to lisa and Y to ford, ownsCar(lisa) can
be deduced form the fact owner(lisa,ford).
This deduction is performed using an algorithm similar to a depth-rst search. A critical
step in this algorithm is the unication of terms. The goal of unication is to nd variable
bindings to make two terms identical. For example, consider the two terms owner(lisa,X)
and owner(Y,ford). By binding X=ford and Y=lisa, these terms are made identical. An in
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detail explanation of the algorithm to nd such unifying variable bindings can be found in
the book of Max Bramer [3, p. 31–35].
In order to prove goals such as the ones shown in the listing above, the Prolog interpreter
has to systematically explore the rule and fact database. Consider for example that we
want to prove the goal owner(X,bmw). In other words, we want to nd all persons who
own a BMW. The interpreter now looks through all facts and rules in the order they are
stated in the program, and tests whether these can be unied with the goal. If this succeeds
for a fact, such as owner(hans,bmw), then a solution has been found.
If however the unication succeeds for a rule, the Prolog interpreter has to step into the
right side of the rule and has to prove its truthness. The proving of this subgoal works
exactly the same way as for the initial goal: Again, we scan the rule and fact database for
uniable denitions. If the proof of this subgoal does not succeed, the interpreter has to
perform backtracking: In order to continue the search of uniable rules and fact for the
initial goal, all variable bindings performed during the proong of the subgoal have to be
undone.
For this case we consider the goal ownsCar(P). In our database, only one denition uni-
fying with this goal exists: ownsCar(X):-owner(X,_). This results in the variable binding
P=X. Next the interpreter has to nd solutions for the subgoal owner(X,_). This yields
the two solutions P=X=hans;_=bmw and P=X=lisa;_=ford. After these two successes,
the subgoal fails. This means, that backtracking is performed and the variable binding
P=X is undone. Afterwards, the interpreter continues to scan for terms unifying with
ownsCar(P), which also fails. This means, that all solutions have been found. Again, a
more detailed explanation of this algorithm can be found in the book of Max Bramer [3,
p. 39–50].
A noteworthy property of Prolog is that it is very simple to write correct logical programs
as the language species the implementation on how to nd proofs. However, it can become
quite dicult to write ecient programs due to the nature of the depth-rst search used by
the solver as introduced above. For example, Prolog species that the solver examines the
rules in the order they appear in the program. Therefore, a logical program with a large
number of rules where the rule leading to a successful proof comes early can be expected
to terminate much faster than a program where the rule comes last. In addition, solver
dependent factors can inuence the performance: For example, a solver might decide
to index the rules based on the rst argument in case it is an atom. This mechanism is
explained in more detail in Section 2.2.4. Due to this fact, the order of the arguments can
have a noticeable impact on the performance.
2.2.2. Cut Predicate
The built-in cut predicate of Prolog is a feature which allows to prevent backtracking. It is
best explained by an example:
predA ( a ) .
predA (X ) : − ! , f a i l .
predA ( b ) .
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predB (X) : − predA (X ) .
predB ( c ) .
In this example, the cut predicate written as exclamation mark appears in combination
with the fail predicate, which is a common combination. The fail predicate simply causes
the current goal to fail when reached.
The cut predicate prevents the interpreter from backtracking for the current goal when
it is encountered. Consider that we ask the interpret to prove predA(X). The interpreter
nds a rst solution with X=a. Afterwards, he examines the rule containing the cut
predicate. The cut predicate succeeds to be proven by denition, therefore the interpreter
reaches the fail predicate. As the fail predicate always fails, the proof of the goal using
this rule does not succeed. Without the cut predicate, backtracking would happen and the
interpreter would nd the next solution with X=b. However, the cut operator prevent the
backtracking from happening, therefore no additional solutions are found.
The cut operator only prevents backtracking for the current goal, this is not the case
for any parent goals. Consider we ask the interpreter to prove predB(X) instead. This
immediately leads to predA(X), which yields only X=a and not X=b as result due to
prevented backtracking. However, as the cut appeared while proving the goal predA(X),
it does not prevent the backtracking for the parent goal predB(X). For this reason X=c is
found as additional solution in this example.
Further examples and explanations of the cut predicate can be found in Chapter 7 of
Max Bramers book [3, p. 99-108].
2.2.3. Negation
The logical negation is a commonly required operator when specifying formal constraints.
Prolog does come with the negation operator \+, which however does have a dierent
semantic: The interpreter succeeds to prove a negated term \+ myPredicate(. . . ), if the
term is not provable. This means, that the negation is true, if the goal myPredicate(. . . )
cannot be proven as true. For example, given the fact and rule database from Section 2.2.1,
we can execute the following queries:
?−\+ owner ( l i s a , bmw ) .
true .
?−\+ owner ( l i s a , f o r d ) .
f a l s e .
So far, the behaviour looks the same as for the mathematical logical negation. Where it
diers is when unbound variables are present in the negated term:
?− \+ owner ( X , bmw ) .
f a l s e .
Based on the logic semantic of a negation, we would expect the query to return us all
people who do not own a bmw. This means we would have expected the query to succeed
yielding the binding X=lisa. What prolog does during the evaluation of this query is that
it tries to prove the term owner(X,bmw). This does succeed for the binding X=hans.
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Therefore, because the Prolog negation is dened based on the not-provable semantic, the
negation returns fail as result as the term could be proven.
It however is possible to mimic the behaviour of a logical negation using the not-provable
negation of Prolog. This can be done by simply binding all unbound variables prior to
executing the negation. In our example we rst need to dene a predicate in order to make
it possible for Prolog to know which atoms are persons:
person ( l i s a ) .
person ( hans ) .
This predicate can be employed as generator, meaning that it can be used to instantiate
a variable to all possible person atoms. Now we can formulate the logical negation as
follows, which yields the expected result:
?− person (X ) , \+ owner ( X , bmw ) .
X= l i s a
Note that this approach can be very expensive performance wise: The Prolog interpreter
has to try to prove the negated term for every variable combination which are instantiated
using the generators. Depending on the value space of the variables, this can easily lead
to a very long runtime.
2.2.4. Predicate Indexing
In Section 2.2.1 we briey described the basic algorithm for proong goals in Prolog. We
explained that it is required to scan the database for rules and facts which unify with the
goal. This can naively be implemented using a linear search where we simply try out
every denition. This approach does however not scale well when the size of the program
increases. In order to optimize this search for uniable rules and facts indexing mechanism
are required which allow a quick lookup of candidates.
We consider again the example predicate ownsCar(P,C) from Section 2.2.1, but we
assume that the program contains much more facts for persons and their cars:
ownsCar ( l i s a , f o r d ) .
ownsCar ( l i s a , vw ) .
ownsCar ( f r i t z , a u d i ) .
. . .
ownsCar ( hans , bmw ) .
ownsCar ( hans , o p e l ) .
Assume that we want to lookup the cars owned by hans: ownsCar(hans,X). The more
facts we have about people and their cars, the longer the linear search approach takes for
nding the solutions for this goal.
An observation that has been made early, is that often rules and facts are dened with
their rst argument being an atom and not a variable. Similarly, goals as ownsCar(hans,X)
also often have an atom as rst argument specied. Based on this observationrst argument




The idea of rst argument indexing is simple: The database of facts and rules is realized
as a hashtable. Hereby, the combination of the predicate name, its arity and the atom used
as rst argument is used as lookup key for the hashtable. In the following example we
solely focus on the atom argument as hash key as we only use one predicate:
%−−−− Hashbucke t f o r ’ l i s a ’
ownsCar ( l i s a , f o r d ) .
ownsCar ( l i s a , vw ) .
%−−−− Hashbucke t f o r ’ f r i t z ’
ownsCar ( f r i t z , a u d i ) .
. . .
%−−−− Hashbucke t f o r ’ hans ’
ownsCar ( hans , bmw ) .
ownsCar ( hans , o p e l ) .
When asking the Prolog interpreter to proof the goal ownsCar(hans,X), he can simply
inspect the rules in the hashbucket for hans and omit inspecting all other rules. This leads
to a signicant performance improvement.
However, this indexing approach quickly reaches its limits. For example, queries where
the rst argument is a variable, such as ownsCar(P,bmw) cannot make use of this index.
In this case linear search has to be used as fallback again. Another example where rst
argument indexing provides no benet is if there are very many rules with the same atom
as rst argument, as this leads to big hashbuckets.
For this reason, more sophisticated indexing approaches have been proposed [7, 30]. In
contrast to rst argument indexing, these approaches greatly vary from Prolog implemen-
tation to implementation.
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The goal of this thesis is to design and implement a tool for the automated detection of
violations of data ow constraints. As the range of such scenarios is very wide, we focus
on two scenario classes for the design of our approach: Access Control and Geolocation
Privacy Restrictions. In this section we provide a general introduction to these two scenario
classes.
3.1. Access Control
A traditional problem in software security is the management of the access rights of
dierent parties to resources in a multi-user environment. One of the most known examples
for an access control systems is the Unix le permission management. Other variations of
the access control systems also exist, for example the Bell-LaPadula Model [2] which tries
to prevent the ow of ow of information classied as “high” to information classied as
“low”.
In our approach we dene the considered Access Control problem as follows: Every
party which accesses restricted data performs its access with one or more Roles. In our
case, this means that every software component of the system-under-investigation has
such a role assigned. In turn every datum is annotated with a set of Authorized Roles.
In this basic form, only components whose role is present in the set of authorized roles
are allowed to access this datum. The set of authorized roles is not static. As the datum
ows through the system, it may be altered. For example, access rights may be granted
or revoked as the datum is processed by dierent operations. This model can be further
rened by specifying the type of access rights. For example, common types of access rights
are read and write access. In this case, there is a separate set of authorized roles for each
type of rights attached to each datum.
As simple example for a system with access control restrictions is the TravelPlanner
case study
1
of the IFlow project [18]. The TravelPlanner application in the case study is
modeled as a mobile application which allows the user to plan their trip, including the
direct booking of ights. The data ow of this booking transaction illustrates how the
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Table 3.1.: Roles of the involved Actors and Systems of the Travel Planner example.
Datum Authorized Roles
rq:RequestData User, TravelAgency, Airline
o:FlightOers User, TravelAgency, Airline
o:SingleFlightOer User, Airline
rr:RoleSet no access control
allowed:RoleSet no access control
ccd:CreditCardData default: User
after declassication: User, Airline
Table 3.2.: Involved Data with its access control restrictions of the Travel Planner example.
In the scenario, the user has in addition to the TravelPlanner application the CreditCard-
Center application installed which is responsible for managing the access to the credit
card data of the user. Initially, the credit card data of the user only has the authorized role
User, implying that no component is allowed to access it. However, for the booking of
the ight, the credit card data must be sent to the airlines booking application. Therefore,
with conrmation of the user the Airline role is added to the set of authorized roles of the
credit card details datum. Afterwards, this datum then can be transferred to the airlines
booking application without violating access rights.
Our slightly adapted version of this booking transaction is illustrated in Figure 3.1. The
roles involved in this example are User, TravelAgency and Airline. Hereby it is noteworthy
that the TravelPlanner as well as the CreditCardCenter application have the User roles
as they are installed on the users smartphone. The mapping of the involved parties to
their roles is shown in Table 3.1. In addition, the access control restrictions for all of the
involved data is shown in Table 3.2.
The ight booking transaction starts with a simple query of the user for all matching
ight oers. For this purpose he passes his preferences via the (rq : ReqeustData) object
to the TravelPlanner application. The request is then forwarded to the TravelAgency,
which contacts the Airline(s) to nd matching oers. These oers are represented by the
(o : FlightOers) object. This object is returned as response to the user along the same
call chain backwards. In this part of the transaction, no access control restrictions are
present: Both the request as well as the response are public data, as all involved roles have
access rights as shown in Table 3.2.
This is not the case for the second part of the booking transaction: As the user proceeds
to select and book his ight, access control restrictions are involved. After the user has
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received all possible ight oers, he selects the one he would like to book in the (o : Sin-
gleFlightOer) object. This object may only be accessed under the User or the Airline role,
as the Airline needs to know which ight is booked. However, the TravelAgency is not
allowed to learn which ight the user selected and is therefore not authorized.
The booking starts with the user sending his selected ight to the TravelPlanner ap-
plication. The TravelPlanenr applications then forwards the selection combined with
the credit card data of the user to the Airline. The credit card data is represented by the
(ccd : CreditCCardData) object. However, the TravelPlanner application does not have
access to the credit card data, as it is managed by the CreditCardCenter application. In
addition, it underlies very strict access control restrictions: The credit card data normally
may only be accessed by the user as shown in Table 3.2.
For the booking to proceed, the credit card data has to be declassied rst to allow it
to be accessed under the Airline role. For this purpose the TravelPlanner sends a request
for the declassied credit card data to the CreditCardCenter application. As payload the
request contains a role request (rr : RoleSet). This RoleSet describes which roles request
access to the credit card data. The CreditCardCenter application in turn asks the user
for permission for declassifying the data for these roles. The user then responds with
(allowed : RoleSet) which contains the roles for which the user has granted access. Then
the CreditCardCenter application returns the credit card data as (ccd : CreditCardData) to
the TravelPlanner. This credit card data has then been declassied for the roles which
where allowed by the user as shown in Table 3.2. So in this case, the credit card data would
be authorized for the roles User and Airline. As last step the TravelPlanner now sends the
credit card data as well as the selected ight to the Airline to book the ight.
3.2. Geolocation Privacy Restrictions
The denition of the Geolocation Privacy Restrictions scenario type is based on the scenario
presented by Seifermann et al.[27] as well as the work of Weimann [33].
This scenario class is based on the observation, that often legal aspects imply geolocation
restrictions on data ows. For example with the General Data Protection Regulations
certain personal data is only allowed to be processed or stored within the European Union
or certain countries with equivalent privacy regulations. So in general, this scenario
class restricts data ows based on (a) the type of the data being transmitted and (b) the
geolocation where the data is being processed or stored.
For the classication of the data based on its type, a sensible abstraction is to dene
condentiality levels for the data. We use the denition of these levels as well as the
general privacy denition from the work of Weimann [33]:
• Type-0: Personal Information: Data which relates directly or indirectly to per-
sonal information.
• Type 1: Personally Identiable Information: This data does not directly contain
personal information. However, when combined with other Type-0 or Type-1 data,
personal information can be completely or partially reconstructed.
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• Type-2: Anonymous Data: Data which even when anaylzed combination with
any other data cannot provide any personal information.
For the classication of geolocations, the two categories safe and unsafe are used.
Hereby, data of any of the types presented above is allowed to be processed or stored in
safe geolocations. In unsafe locations, it is never permitted to process or store Type-0 data
while Type-2 data does not underlie any restrictions.
A special case is the Type-1 data: When deployed individually in an unsafe geolocation,
no privacy violatiosn are induced according to the denition of Type-1 data. However,
when Type-1 data of dierent sources are processed or stored together in the same location,
it is possible that Type-0 data can be derived. This problem is known as joining data streams
[33]. In conclusion two ows of Type-1 data are only allowed to be deployed together in
an unsafe location, if their information origins from the same Type-1 data source. This
restriction implies that both data ows eectively contain the same information, which
prevents teh derivation of Type-0 data.
In our work we use an online shop scenario as running example for geolocation data
ow restrictions. This scenario is based on an example given in Section 3.1 of the work
of Weimann[33]. Figure 3.2 illustrates the interaction of a user with the example online
shop system. The privacy level of the data passed between the user and the components is
indicated by its text color.
The user in the example rst visits the page of a product and afterwards performs a
checkout of his shopping cart. For these transactions he interacts with the ShopServer
component. He begins by requesting the details page for a product. The ShopServer
generates the product page which includes the recommendations in the form “user who
have bought . . . also bought . . . ” which are common for online shops. In addition, the
ShopServer generates transaction logs for monitoring purposes. The log data is written
into a log database illustrated by the LogDB component. The transaction log entry is
classied as Type-1 data.
Afterwards, the user performs a checkout of his cart. For this purpose he transmits his
shopping cart as well as his customer information, such as his address, to the ShopServer.
Both these data are Type-0 data. His customer information is then stored in the UserDB
component. The shopping cart provided by the user is not directly stored, but instead
is transformed into an AnonymizedOrder. This anonymized order does not contain any
reference to the user, it only consists of a timestamp as well as the bought products. It
is used to update the recommendation model managed by the RecommendationSystem
component.
However, the AnonymizedOrder is not fully anonymous, it is classied as Type-1 data
instead. When combined with the TransactionLog generated during the checkout transac-
tion, personal information can be derived: The TransactionLog also contains timestamps.
This allows a correlation with the timestamp of the AnonymizedOrder, which in turn can























Figure 3.2.: UML sequence diagram of the interaction of a user with the example online shop system.
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We chose this example as it illustrates the problem of joining data streams: The Recom-
mendationSystem as well as the LogDB do not have access to Type-0 data. Therefore, they
can be deployed in unsafe locations individually. However, they are note allowed to be
deployed in the same unsafe location, because then their data can be correlated to derive
personal information.
The presented example is a very basic instantiation of this scenario. In this case,
constraint violations can be trivially detected by inspecting the edges of the data ows
in combination with the owing data types. However, the complexity increases when
taking additional factors into account: For example, in the work of Seifermann et al.[27] an
exception is made for the restriction of the ow of private data: In their scenario personal
data is also allowed to ow across the borders if it is encrypted. However, whether the
data is encrypted depends on the processing performed in the application server before




In this chapter we give an overview of existing work related to our approach. First, in
Section 4.1 we show the dierences to other approaches in the eld of data ow analysis.
As the scalability is an important aspect for our approach we outline other work related to
the performance of Prolog in Section 4.2.
4.1. Data Flow Analysis
While the UML meta model [20] is widely used in the eld of software engineering, in
its core it does not include means for modeling data ow security properties of software
systems. For this reason, UMLSec [16] has been proposed as an extension for UML to
fulll this purpose. In UMLSec, security is modeled using UML Stereotypes and UML
Tags paired with constraints. Using these means, the properties of the system as well as
adversaries can be modeled.
In addition an automated analysis for such models has been proposed [17]. However,
this approach requires the denition of a specialized constraint analysis on a per-scenario
basis. A list of available implementations for specic checks can be found online for the
UMLSec analysis tool CARiSMA1. In contrast to this, our approach aims to provide a more
generic analysis platform where writing a full-edged analysis for each scenario is not
necessary.
Other approaches, such as JOANA [12] analyse data ows on code level. JOANA analyses
Java bytecode to ensure non-inference. Non-inference is a data-ow requirement, that no
information about data classied as secret may leak into data classied as not-secret for
example through computations. In contrast to this, our proposed approach operates on
architecture level. As a result our approach requires manual modeling, it however allows
the analysis of additional data ow constraints dierent from non-inference.
Another data ow modeling language that has been proposed is EDDY [4]. EDDY has
been designed for managing privacy and security requirements of multi-tier applications.
The goal is to ensure that formulated requirements are met across all tiers, where the
dierent tiers are owned by dierent companies or parties in general. In their work,
facebook is used as running example in the role of a platform provider for facebook
games by third-party companies. The formulation of such constraints is performed via
description logic. The main dierence to our proposed approach is that EDDY tries to
check the compatibility of services based on the requirements dened in their contracts.





An approach which operates on both runtime and model level is iObserve [13]. In
general, iObserve aims to support the software evolution process of cloud applications.
This is done by continuously monitoring the target application and updating corresponding
models based on the monitoring data. In further work iObserve was extended to detect
data ow violations based on the deployment geolocation [33]. The main dierence to our
approach is that the work of Weimann does not analyse data ows, but instead uses the
structural features of components to nd deployment constraint violations.
Many approaches for analysing data ows focus on mobile applications. TaintDroid
[11] has been proposed for tracking the ow of privacy-sensitive data within android
applications. The idea of this approach is to detect the ow sinks of privacy-sensitive data,
such as the geolocation or data from the contact list. Therefore, the approach is similar to
ours as it allows to analyse a specialized constraint: The detection of privacy relevant data
leaving the application. Our approach however aims to be more generic, so that dierent
types of constraints can also be evaluated.
A similar approach for non-mobile systems is Privacy Oracle [15]. However, in contrast
to TaintDroid this approach does not modify the code. Privacy Oracle treats the monitored
system as a black-box and only monitors the network trac of it. In this work the authors
propose a testing technique for correlating perturbations in the input data of the system
with perturbations in the output of the system for detecting privacy leaks. This allows
for example to detect the unencrypted transmission of data classied as sensitive. Again
however, this approach focuses on specialized set of constraints and scenarios, whereas
our approach aims to be more generic.
4.2. Prolog Performance
We decided to use the logic programming language Prolog for the implementation of the
analysis for our approach. As a central aspect of our work is the scalability, it is therefore
necessary to investigate which factors inuence the performance of Prolog. In Chapter 7
we introduce antipatterns we discovered when generating Prolog code and how they can
be tackled.
Unfortunately we found only few scientic sources which examine the performance
inuence factors of Prolog. Most of the work we found focuses on how to implement a
fast Prolog interpreter and not how to write fast Prolog programs. An example for such a
guideline on how to implement an ecient Prolog interpreter is the work of Van Roy et
al. [31]. Even though the paper is very old it can be used for deducing how to eciently
write Prolog code. For example it is shown how rst argument predicate indexing is
implemented, which in turn allows to deduce how Prolog code can be written to make
use of this mechanism. In addition, scientic resources are also available for advanced
mechanism such as the indexing approach of the ECLiPSe interpreter [26].
A good non-scientic guideline on writing ecient Prolog code is provided on the
homepage of Markus Triska [10]. There general rules are given to improve performance,
for example on how to structure predicates to make use of the implemented indexing
mechanisms.
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In Chapter 4 we outlined the limitations of existing data ow constraint analysis ap-
proaches: in most cases the models are designed for an intuitive high-level representation
of data ow constraints instead of for an ecient automated analysis. Therefore, often
specialized per-scenario analysis tools or manual analyses based on domain knowledge
are required for analysing the data ows of systems regarding constraints. For this reason,
we dene our own data ow system model in this chapter, which supports automated
analysis. In contrast to existing models, our data ow system model is designed to be
translatable to an ecient Prolog program. At the same time, we aim to keep our model
generic enough so that a wide range of scenarios can be represented using it.
Our model is not designed to be manually dened by developers. Instead, it is designed
in a fashion that it can easily be derived form existing data ow modeling approaches,
which in turn can be manually dened in an intuitive way. We expect several benets
from our approach: Firstly, our model enables a consistent way of dening the input data
for data ow analyses. This consistency in turn eases the denition of dierent analyses.
Secondly, this reduces the coupling between the system denition and the analysis.
However, for this idea to be applicable, it is required that our analysis runs reasonably
ecient. This is ensured through performance optimization we present in Chapter 7 and
evaluated in Chapter 8.
We start by giving a conceptual overview of our model in Section 5.1 and Section 5.2.
Afterwards in Section 5.3 to Section 5.6 we give a detailed denition of it. Finally, in
Section 5.7 we show how the example scenarios presented in Chapter 3 can be represented
using our meta model.
5.1. Conceptual Overview
We can identify the following two core requirements for our system model: It (a) has to
be capable of expressing most of the common data ow analysis scenarios and (b) must be
translatable into an ecient Prolog program.
Figure 5.1 shows a simplied illustration of an instance of our system meta model. The
basic idea is to model data ows very similarly to the typical structure of software: data
ows through the system in the form of parameters for operation calls and in the form of
their return values. Similarly to the Data Centric Palladio approach, the data is hereby
dened by its meta-attributes, not the concrete data values. The available attributes for
each type of data are dened in data types. Note that the parameters and operations in our
model do not necessarily correspond to variables or methods in the modeled application.
Our meta model denes a data ow, whereas the variables and methods of applications
are usually dened based on the control ow.
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2. (c : d2) ()
d1 : Datatype
encryption ⊆ {DES, AES, RSA}












Figure 5.1.: Conceptual illustration of an instance of our meta model
A data type consists of a set of attributes, which represent meta-attributes of the data.
Examples for such meta-attributes are the encryption status or the set of roles which are
authorized for access. Every attribute has a set of possible values assigned.
An instance of a data type denes which subset of the values of each attribute of the
corresponding data type is present. This is explained in detail in Section 5.3. For example,
the operation Source 1 calls Operation 1 with the parameter a of type d1. The data type
d1 consist of the two attributes encryption and authorizedRoles. These two attributes each
dene their set of possible values. As the parameter a is an instance of d1, it denes which
of the possible values are present for each attribute. For example, a could be dened with
a.encryption = {} and a.authorizedRoles = {customer, admin}. This instantiation would
dene a as unencrypted data which is allowed to be accessed by the customer as well as
the admin role. In other words each data instance dat denes boolean variables in the
form of dat.attribute.value = true/f alse for each of the attributes and the values of its
data type. This set of boolean expressions allows for a simple transformation into a logical





encryption ⊆ {DES, AES, RSA}






Figure 5.2.: Example of an decryption operation
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In our model operations are actions which transform data. Hereby, transformation
means that the values of attributes are possibly changed or newly dened. It is even
possible to generate data of a dierent type from the input data. Each operation has a
signature, which contains a named and typed list of parameters. The types hereby are
data types which have to be dened as explained previously. In addition, each operation
also has a well dened named and typed list of return values. The modication of the
data an operation performs is formalized using propositional logic. An example for such a
denition of a modication is given in Figure 5.2. In this example an operation performing
a decryption is shown. For each attribute and value of the return value out, a boolean logic
formula denes its truthness. This formula is allowed to depend on the values of input
parameters to the operation. While in the example only simple assignments are performed,
the formulas are allowed to be of any complexity by employing logical operators, such
as or, and or not. In addition to depending on input parameters of the current operation,
the action may also depend on Properties of the operation as well as the return values
of previously issued calls to other operations. An additional variable type such terms
can depend on are state variables which we introduce in Section 5.2. The idea is that the
logical program for evaluating constraints starts with the denition of the return value.
The interpreter then traces through the dependencies of the return value denition to
prove the constraints.
For example, consider that an operation calls the decryption operation shown in Fig-
ure 5.2. When querying the return value of this call, the Prolog interpreter looks at the
denition of the return value of the decryption operation. Because this return value
depends on the call parameters, the interpreter then looks at the denition of the cor-
responding call parameters. As these again may depend on other variables, the Prolog
interpreter transitively follows the denitions through the system.
Note that this explicitly does not require a trial of all possible call sequences up to their
root. Instead, a trial is only required until all dependencies are resolved. For example,
consider we wanted to prove that a datum is not encrypted. If we trace backwards through
the system and nd an “decrypt” operation on our way we do not need to trace further.
The reason is that the decrypt operation denes the encryption attribute without any
dependencies.
As illustrated by the numbering on the edges of Operation 1 in Figure 5.1, outgoing calls
must have a xed order. Properties are sets of values dened per operation. These are
used to model properties of operations which are independent of their input parameters.
An example where properties are useful is the modeling of the geolocation of the server
which performs this operation. Another example is the modeling of the role under which
the operation accesses its data in case of an access control scenario. Note properties are
dened as constant and cannot be modied during the execution of the operation.
Operations are allowed to call other operations, as done by Operation 1 in Figure 5.1.
For such a call to take place, the required call parameters of the called operation have to
be specied. This is done exactly as for the specication of the return values: for each call,
a set of propositional logic formulas denes the truthness of each attribute and value pair
for each call parameter. These formulas again are allowed to depend on several variables:
the properties of any operation, the parameters with which the current operation was
called as well as the return values of other called operations. However, as these calls are
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performed in their specied order, the parameter denition of a call may only depend on
the return values of previously issued calls. They are not allowed to depend on the return
values of calls which are performed after the current one.
5.2. Data Flows without Control Flow
So far, operations have been modeled as stateless: Their computation only depends on
input parameters and the return values of called operations. Across dierent calls of the
same operation, no data is shared so far. In addition according to our current denition,
the data ow is bound to the control ow. This means, that it is not possible to pass data
around without explicitly calling the receiving operation. However, in data ow modeling










 (p1 : Data)
Computes the 
return value 
using p1 and p2
Data flow only,
No control flow
Figure 5.3.: Minimal example of a data joining scenario where a data ow without control
ow is required.
In this example the operation JoinData joins the data from two dierent sources. This
example can not be modeled yet using the features of our approach we explained so far:
we only have dened data ows bound to control ows. However, we can transform this
scenario so that it represents the same functionality while being representable with our
meta model. This is illustrated in Figure 5.4.
As shown in Figure 5.4, the problematic data ow has been removed. It was replaced
with a return value of Operation2 and an additional parameter of JoinData. Instead of
directly passing the data to JoinData, we attach it to the control ow until it reaches its
destination.
This example shows how data ows which are not bound to control ow can be erased
in general: For each such data ow, an implicit return value and call parameter is added to
each operation. These parameters and return values then represent the datum. However,
we decided for usability reasons to include a mechanism into our meta-model for passing
data around without being bound to the control ow. Our Prolog translator presented in
Chapter 6 performs the task of transforming these ows to implicit parameters and return
values.
The mechanism we introduced for such special data ows are state variables. Just like














using p1 and p2
p1 is the value returned 
from Operation 2
Figure 5.4.: Functionally equivalent scenario to the scenario in Figure 5.3 with all data
ows bound to the control ow.
However, in contrast they are globally accessible: They can be written and read at any
time by any operation, not only by the operation which owns them. A write on a state
variable remains persistent until it is overridden.
With state variables we can now trivially model the example shown in Figure 5.3:
JoinData denes a state variable for p1. Operation 2 now writes to this state variable when
it is called. As the variable is persistent, it can be read and processed by JoinData as soon
as this operation is executed.
5.3. Type Definitions
In our meta model, the root element System acts as a container for all rst class entities.
Figure 5.5 is an excerpt from the meta model which shows the System denition including
its contents. Such a system denes which Operations it contains as well as the usage of
system entry points through SystemUsage elements. In addition, it contains typing related
elements: DataTypes, Attributes, Properties and their common type ValueSetType.
We decided to introduce System as a container for rst class entities for technical reasons.
Apart from this, System elements are not relevant for our approach.
As explained in the previous section DataTypes are used to model information about a
datum on meta level. Variables represent operation parameters, return values and state
variables. To specify their type they reference a DataType. This is explained later in more
detail in Section 5.4. As it is common for variables to have the same type, we decided to
model DataType as rst class entities.
DataTypes are dened just as a named set of Attributes. Attributes hereby model the
previously explained meta attributes of data which ows through the system. Examples
for such meta attributes are the authorized roles in an access control scenario which
are allowed to access the data or the encryption of the data. The encryption attribute
example also shows why it is benecial to model Attributes as rst class entities instead of
being owned by a single DataType: Often, DataTypes have attributes such as encryption
in common. For example, for the geolocation restrictions scenario the customer data as
well as the order information can be modeled as dierent data types. However, depending
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Figure 5.5.: Excerpt of the UML class diagram of the system element and its contents
on the context it can make sense for both to specify the encryption. Therefore, it is useful
to share an encryption Attribute between these to avoid redundancies in the model and
later in the generated code.
Properties allow to specify constant meta information about operations. From a technical
perspective it would have been possible to avoid the denition of separate Properties.
Instead it would have been possible to reuse the Attributes of a system. However, we
decided to keep them separated due to the semantic dierence: While Attributes of data
can change as the data ows through the system and is processed by Operations, Properties
are constants attached to Operations. Now it can be questioned why Properties where
introduced in the rst place if they are constants. As we expect that instances of our
model are generated automatically and not altered by developers, constants could just
be directly inlined where they are used. However while we expect that the model is
generated automatically, we do not expect the formulation of constraint queries to be done
fully automated: For example, all Operations could have a Property deploymentLocation
attached. If this property was not present and instead inlined everywhere it is used, it
would be hard to formulate a query such as “For all operations which are not deployed
in the EU the input parameters must be encrypted”. When modeling Properties explicitly,
a simple Prolog generator-predicate can be used for a readable denition of this query.
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Without the denition of Properties one would have to manually enumerate all operations
which are not deployed in the EU.
The nal element of the typing system in our meta model are ValueSetTypes which
contain a set of Values. A ValueSetType species the type of an Attribute or Property. The
contained Values dene all possible values of which a certain subset is present for the
instances. This is best explained by a simple example: Let’s say we have the Property
“deploymentLocation” and theAttribute “origin”, which species from which country a data
originates. One can observe that both share the same ValueSetType, which could be named
“geolocation”. This ValueSetType now denes which values are possible geolocations.
Depending on the required granularity and countries, the Values could be “US”, “EU” and
“Asia”. This example also shows why we decided to model ValueSetTypes as rst class
entities: they are commonly shared between multiple Attribute and Properties.
In addition, Figure 5.5 shows that Operations and SystemUsages share a common super
type: Caller. This super type was extracted due to the fact that both have the ability to






































Figure 5.6.: Excerpt of the UML class diagram of the operation class and its related elements
An Operation is closely related to functions or methods in traditional programming
languages: It is a formal specication on how output data is generated based on input values.
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In this section we introduce the structural elements required for dening operations. The
elements required for a denition of what an Operation does are introduced in Section 5.6.
An overview of the structural elements required for the Operation denition are shown in
Figure 5.6
An Operation has a signature which denes the required input data and species the
format of the output data. However, an Operation has to be uniquely identiable in the
system by just its name. In contrast to many programming languages the signature is not
used for this purpose. This requirement does however not restrict the applicability of our
approach: As our model is designed as an intermediate model, composite identiers in the
source model can usually be automatically concatenated to a single identier string for
our model.
In our model the signature is represented by the contained parameter, returnValue and
stateVarible Variables. The order of the Variables hereby does not matter: they are identied
based on their name and the context in which they are referenced. The context is hereby
dened by a) which Operation is referenced and b) whether a return value or a parameter
is referenced. A Variable is basically a referenceable instance of a DataType.
As outlined in the previous section, meta information about Operations can be dened
using Properties. For this purpose, each Operation contains a set of PropertyDenitions. A
PropertyDenition is associated with the Property which is being dened as well as with
the Values which are present. Hereby, it is required that these Values are owned by the
ValueSetType which is the type of the dened Property. Every Value of this type which is
not present in the presentValues association is implicitly set to false for this Property. For
each Property, an Operation may contain only one PropertyDenition at maximum.
As previously explained Operations and SystemUsages share the common super type
Caller. This type was introduced due to the fact that both have the ability to call Operations.
In the model a call to an Operation is represented by an OperationCall instance, which
is owned by the Caller. An OperationCall has to reference which Operation is being
called, which is done through the callee association. Note that the list of OperationCalls is
ordered and that each OperationCall has a name which is unique in the list. The list order
semantically represents the order in which the calls occur. This is important because for
OperationCalls which appear later in the list it is possible to reference the return values of
previously issued OperationCalls.
OperationCalls are named to make it possible to represent call sequences without ambi-
guities. An OperationCall cannot uniquely be identied by the callee and caller, as it is
possible for an Operation to call another Operation more than one time. While in theory
it would be sucient to just use the index of each OperationCall within its containing
Caller, we decided to introduce the name eld instead. The reasoning behind this decision
is that call sequences will often be shown to the user of our constraint analysis tool when









5.5. Propositional Logic Terms
Each OperationCall also needs to provide values for the parameters of the called Operation.
An explanation on how this is done is given in Section 5.6.
SystemUsages are used for modeling the entry points which can also act as data sources.
They dene a sequence ofOperationCalls which are issued and may have interdependencies
in their parameter assignments. Basically SystemUsages are Operations which cannot be
called and which do not have parameters, return values or state variables.
A noteworthy limitation of our approach is that recursion is not supported: This means,
that the directed graph formed byOperations through their OperationCalls has to be acyclic.
The reason for this limitation is that as previously explained the Prolog interpreter tries
to nd proofs by tracing backwards through the dependencies of the variables. However,
if the call graph contains cycles, there are cyclic dependencies. This would result in an
innite recursion of the Prolog interpreter.













Figure 5.7.: Excerpt of the UML class diagram of the basic propositional logic terms.
In our approach the combination of a variable within its calling context with an attribute
of it and one of its possible values can be seen as a boolean variable. Therefore, we employ
propositional logic terms for formulating the value of assignments. The operators we use
are functionally complete, therefore any truth table can be represented.
In the model we express propositional logic in a tree structure, as shown in Figure 5.7.
For this reason, every logic term inherits from the abstract super class LogicTerm. A logic
term can either be atomic or compound depending on whether it is a root or a leaf in
the tree. For the representation of the constants true and false, the atomic terms True
and False were introduced. As compound terms we added Not as logical negation, And as
conjunction and Or as disjunction.
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We chose these three compound operators for several reasons: First, this operator system
is the typical logical operator system which is also implemented in classic programming
languages, such as Java. This allows terms to be easily dened by developers. While we
do not expect that it is necessary for developers to alter the logic terms used in variable
assignments, logic terms will also be used for formulating the constraints. The latter part
can be expected to be done at least partly manually.
A second reason for this choice of operators is that it potentially reduces the amount of
negations: Whereas for example the operator systems {∧,¬} or {∨,¬} are functionally
complete, they typically require more negations to represent the same formula as when
using the system {∧,∨,¬}. Negations however can be expensive in terms of performance
































Figure 5.8.: Excerpt of the UML class diagram of the reference types for logic terms.
In addition to basic atomic and compound terms Figure 5.8 shows the second type of
atomic terms available: references to parameters, return values and properties. References
to return values and call parameters are required as these variables are non constant and
context dependent. Property references could in theory just be replaced by their value
28
5.5. Propositional Logic Terms
with True or False terms. However, as previously explained it is useful to have the ability
to reference properties when formulating constraint queries, which is potentially done
manually.
PropertyRefs are simple to dene: They just require an association to the Operation they
refer to, the Property to read and the corresponding Value of which the truthness shall
be queried. It is required, that the Operation has a PropertyDenition for this Property and
that the Value given belongs to the type of the Property. Note that the reference to the
Value is optional. If no Value is dened, a wildcard is assumed for the value, which means
that the actual Value read gets chosen based on the context. For example, a wildcard can be
used to initialize all values of a variable to false with a single assignment. The wildcarding
mechanics are explained in detail in the next section.
A ParameterRef is used to reference call arguments of an Operation. The concrete value
of the parameter depends on from where the operation was called. A ParameterRef is
dened by a reference to the Variable, which must be a call parameter, and the Attribute
and Value to query. TheOperation which is referenced is implicitly referenced as it contains
the Variable as parameter. For type safety, it is required that the Attribute is part of the
DataType of the referenced Variable. In addition, the referenced Value must belong to the
type of the Attribute.
Return values are referenced very similarly to call arguments through ReturnValueRefs.
They also have references to a Variable, Attribute and Value. While for the Attribute and
Value the same restrictions apply as when used in a ParameterRef, the Variable must
reference a return value Variable instead of a parameter. In addition, the OperationCall of
which the return value shall be queried has to be referenced. The callee of this call has to



















Figure 5.9.: Excerpt of the UML class diagram of the state reference types for logic terms.
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Logic Term Notation
And [rstOperand] ∧ [secondOperand]









Table 5.1.: Notation for logic terms. The values in square brackets are replaced with their
real values when used.
As shown in Figure 5.9 references to state variables using StateRef or DefaultStateRef
are highly similar to ParameterRefs. They also require a reference to a Variable, which in
this case has to be a state variable. In addition, an Attribute and Value can be specied, for
which the same restrictions apply as for ParameterRefs or ReturnValueRefs. In contrast to
these there is no restrictions on which Variable can be referenced as long as it is a state
variable. As previously mentioned, state variables of any operation can be read and written
at any time.
The dierence between StateRef and DefaultStateRef is that StateRef refers to the
current value of the given variable. This means that the value is returned, to which the
variable has previously been set. In contrast, DefaultStateRef refers to the default value
of the variable. The default value is the value a state variable has when it has not been
written yet. This default value is dened by the operation which owns the variable, which
is shown in the next section.
Note that for all kinds of variable references the reference to both the Attribute and the
Value are optional. Again, if no value for these is given, a wildcard is used instead when
generating the Prolog code.
Instead of using UML instance graphs for Logic terms as concrete syntax, we introduce
the notation shown in Table 5.1. This notation is the same as the classic notation for
propositional logic terms with the addition of a special syntax for property and variable
references.
5.6. Variable Assignments
In the previous section we explained how logic terms are represented in our meta model.
In this section we introduce how they are used for the specication of the behaviour of
Operations. For this purpose we employ logic terms to provide denitions for return values,
call parameters and state variables.
Figure 5.10 shows the VariableAssignment which is used for this task. A VariableAssign-






































Figure 5.10.: Excerpt of the UML class diagram of the VariableAssignment type.
Operation, it is used to dene a return value of this operation or a state variable. For state
variables Operations own two types of assignments. First there are defaultStateDenitions
which dene the default value of state variables which are owned by this Operation. This
means that the value dened by these assignments is returned if the corresponding state
variable is read before it was written. The second type of state assignments of Operations
are postExecutionStateDenitions. These assignments dene the changes to make to state
variables before the Operation returns.
In case that a VariableAssignment is contained within an OperationCall, it is either used
to dene the value of the arguments passed to the callee for this call or to dene state
changes prior to performing the call. Both postExecutionStateDenitions and preCallStat-
eDenitions are optional: If none are dened, the value of the state variables are not
altered.
In all cases state variables are assigned last. This means that when performing a call, the
call arguments are dened rst and state variable changes are executed directly afterwards.
Similarly, when an Operation returns it rst denes its return values and changes state
variables afterwards. This order ensures that the denitions of return values and call
parameters can refer to state variables before they are overridden.
The left-hand side of the assignment is dened by a reference to a Variable, Attribute
and a Value. Depending on the container of the VariableAssignment, the Variable must
either be a return value, a call parameter or a state variable. The Attribute must be part
of the type of the Variable and the Value must belong to the type of the Attribute. The
right-hand side of the assignment, the value, is dened by a LogicTerm. This LogicTerm
can be a compound term of any complexity as introduced in the previous section.
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The logic term on the right side hereby is noted as described by Table 5.1.
Again, the Attribute and Value references are optional. If they are not present, they are
interpreted as wildcards. We note wildcards using a single asterisk “*” in our notation. We
explain the semantic of a wildcards in the various positions on the left-hand side of an
assignment in the following using examples:
• input.authorizedRoles.* := f alse
For the variable input set all values of the attribute to false. This is useful for example
for initializing all values of a single attribute before selectively overwriting them.
• output.*.* := f alse
For the variable output set all values of all attributes to false. This is useful for
initializing all values of all attribute before selectively overwriting them.
• output.*.EU := true
For the variable output set the value EU of all attributes which have the ValueSetType
of EU to true. This is mainly useful for copying certain values from other variables.
To summarize, wildcards can be used to write a single assignment instead of multiple
ones. For example if a wildcard is used in place of the Value, one could just duplicate the
assignment for each Value manually. There are several benets of such a reduction of
the number of assignments even though assignments are not planned to be generated or
maintained by developers: Firstly, the total size of model instances is reduced. Secondly,
we implement an optimization which allows the translation of wildcard rules to single
Prolog rules, which therefore potentially speeds up the analysis.
Whereas in the examples above we only used constant logic terms on the right-hand
side of the assignments, logic terms of any complexity can be used. The wildcarding
mechanism is especially powerful when using variable references with wildcards. Consider
the following example:
output.*.* := pv(input.{A}.{V})
In this example the Attribute and the Value on the left hand side are wildcards. In addition,
the logic term used on the right hand side of the assignment is ParameterRef of which the
Attribute and the Value are also wildcards. However, wildcards on the left hand side of an
assignment have a dierent semantic than wildcards on the right hand side: wildcards
on the left hand side quantify for which Attributes and Values the assignment should be
used. Wildcards on the right hand side refer to the corresponding bound values instead.
This is comparable to the semantic of the classical mathematical quantors: wildcards on
the left side act as universal quantors (∀x ∈ . . .), wildcards on the right side refer to the
quantied variable (x ).
Because of this dierence of the semantic we note wildcards on the right-hand side
using {A} or {V} depending on whether they refer to the currently bound Attribute or the










Due to the wildcarding mechanism it is possible that multiple rules match for the
assignment of certain Attribute and Value combinations. For this reason, the assignment
associations are ordered as visible in Figure 5.10. Assignments appearing later in these
overwrite previous matching rules.
As illustrated by the initial examples in this section, the position of wildcards on the
left side of assignments has an impact on which Attribute and Value combinations are
possible in an assignment. This is due to the typing system we introduced in Section 5.3.
In addition, wildcards in the LogicTerm used as value for the assignment also restrict the
set of possible combinations. These restrictions are listed in Table 5.2.
Logic Term Induced Restrictions
pr ([operation].[property].{V } {A} must have the same ValueSetType




pa([variable].{A}.{V } {A} must be an Attribute of the DataType
rv([call].[variable].{A}.{V } of [variable].
st([operation].[variable].{A}.{V }
dst([operation].[variable].{A}.{V }




Table 5.2.: Typing restrictions induced by reference logic terms based on wildcards.
5.7. Example Instances
In this section we illustrate how the meta model dened in the previous sections can be
used for modeling data ow constraint scenarios. For this purpose we provide two example
model instances, one for each of the scenarios introduced in Chapter 3. In Section 5.7.1 we
model the TravelPlanner example as access control scenario. Afterwards in Section 5.7.2
we show how our example shop system with its geolocation constraints can be represented
using our model.
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Table 5.3.: DataTypes of the model instance for the TravelPlanner example.
5.7.1. Access Control Scenario
In Section 3.1 we introduced the TravelPlanner example as an instance of an access
control scenario. In this section we show how the TravelPlanner system can be accurately
represented using our proposed meta model. In addition, we give an informal explanation
on how the corresponding access control constraint can be formulated in relation to this
model.
5.7.1.1. Model Definition
The model instance for the TravelPlanner example is shown in Figure 5.11. The model
elements are visually represented in the same way as in Section 5.1. Operations are shown
as white boxes with solid arrows for their out-going calls and dashed arrows for return
values. The properties of each operation are shown as annotation. The corresponding call
parameters and return values are annotated to each arrow. In addition, each call has a
number assigned to specify the order in case of multiple outgoing calls.
The used data types are not dened in Figure 5.11, they are listed in Table 5.3 instead. Ev-
ery data type underlying access control restrictions has the attribute authorizedRoles. The
attribute authorizedRoles has the ValueSetType Roles, which contains the three values User,
TravelAgency and Airline representing the corresponding roles from the TravelPlanner
example.
During the process of the declassication of the credit card data, the RoleSet type is
required for dening for which roles a declassication is requested and in turn granted.
For this purpose, the data type RoleSet contains the attribute roles, which again has the
type Roles. Data of the type RoleSet however does not underlie access control restrictions,
therefore the attribute authorizedRoles is not present.
In addition to the data being classied with authorizedRoles, the operations have to dene
under which role they access the data. This is done using the roles property illustrated by
the annotations of the operations in Figure 5.11.
The VariableAssignments for call parameters and return values are shown as annotations
for each call and return. Hereby, we use the notation for the assignments which we

































































Figure 5.11.: Full system model of the excerpt from the TravelPlanner case study.
3
5
5. Data Flow System Model
The denition of the model for the TravelPlanner example is straightforward: As the
user in the example initiates the booking transaction, he is mapped to the BookingUsage
pictogram shown in Figure 5.11 as the person pictogram. In the example scenario, the user
rst requests the set of possible ights from the Airline indirectly via the TravelAgency
and the TravelPlanner application. This call chain is directly mapped to corresponding
operation calls in our model.
The same applies to the process of booking a selected ight. Hereby, the BookingUsage
initially denes that the selected ight oer may only be accessed by the Airline and User
roles using the authorizedRoles attribute. This oer then gets passed to the TravelPlan-
ner, which in turn requests the declassied credit card data from the CreditCardCenter
application. Hereby, the operation CreditCardCenter-requestDeclassiedCCD is generic: A
declassication can be requested for any set of roles. In this example, it is declassied for
the role Airline.
The interaction where the user is asked whether he grants access to the data for the
requested roles is represented by the operation User-askForCCDDeclassication. This
interaction is realised through an operation instead of a system usage because usages are
only entry points. In this case however, the user is not the entry point but is called instead.
The user then responds with a set of roles for which he granted access to the credit card
data. The CreditCardCenter afterwards sends back the correctly declassied data to the
TravelPlanner application, which in turn books the ight by invoking Airline-bookFlight.
5.7.1.2. Constraint Definition
In the previous section we showed how to map the TravelPlanner example to an instance
of our meta model. However, this model does not contain any semantic information on
how to check for access control violations. This semantic is added by formulating the
constraint as logic program which refers to the model elements.
In this case we dene the authorizedRoles attribute as marker for data which underlies
access control restrictions. It contains the roles which are authorized, whereas each
operation species the roles property to dene under which roles it accesses the data.
Therefore, we can dene the access control constraint as follows:
For each operation owithin any call sequence, for each parameter p of owith the
attribute authorizedRoles, a role rmust exist so that both p.authorizedRoles.r
and o.roles.r are true.
More informally speaking, whenever a parameter is passed to an operation, one of the
operations roles must be authorized for the access to this parameter value.
5.7.2. Geolocation Constraints Scenario
In this section we model the online shop example we introduced in Section 3.2 as an
example for geolocation based data ow constraints. Like in the previous section, we
rst show how to model the occurring data ows using our meta model. Afterwards, we











Table 5.4.: DataTypes of the model instance for the online shop example.
5.7.2.1. Model Definition
The model for the example online shop system is shown in Figure 5.12. Hereby, we use the
same visual representation as in Figure 5.11: The operations are illustrated using white
boxes, operation calls are represented using solid arrows. The operation calls hereby are
annotated with call parameters and return values. The denition of call parameters, return
values and operation properties are represented using annotations.
Like in the previous section, the used types are enumerated separately in Table 5.4. All
used types consist of the same single attribute: level. It denes the privacy level of the
data. Therefore, its ValueSetType denes the three Values type0, type1 and type2. These
correspond exactly to the privacy level we introduced in Section 3.2.
For this denition the design the question may arise why dierent data types were used
when they all consist of the same single attribute. The reason is that we decided to use the
data type to dierentiate between the contained information of variables: For detecting the
problem of joining data streams, it is required to dierentiate between data ows which
have the same information source and data streams which have dierent sources. This is
required because only Type 1 data from dierent sources imposes a constraint violation
when deployed at the same unsafe location. We decided to dene that data has the same
information source when it has the same data type in our model. This decision was made to
keep the model easily understandable, as it is used for illustration purposes. An alternative
representation would be to add an additional attribute to the data which species the
information source.
The geolocation of the operations is represented using the location property. In our
example we used the three regions EU, US and Asia. If required, this can be modeled on a
more ne granular level, e.g. for representing individual data centers within the regions.
Our model does not include a classication of which regions are considered unsafe and
which are considered safe. We decided to leave this classication open for the analysis,
because this way dierent analysis can be performed based on the viewpoint: For example
when analysing under US legal restrictions dierent countries may be considered safe
than when checking EU legal constraints.
The actual operations and operation calls are directly derived from the UML sequence
diagram of the online shop presented in Figure 3.2. Hereby, also the level of the data is





































































In this section we show how the geolocation constraints can be formulated as constraints
for our model of the online shop example. We apply the geolocation constraints we
explained in general in Section 3.2 onto our meta model denition.
The constraint for Type-0 data is straight forward: No data of Type-0 may be processed
or stored in an unsafe location. Applied onto our model, this imposes the following
constraint:
For each operation o within any call sequence, for each parameter p of o where
the level is type0, the deployment specied by the location property of o must
be a safe location.
For Type-1 data, the constraint is more complex due to the problem of joining data
streams. However, as we dened for our model that data has the same source exactly when
its data type is the same, it also can be expressed:
For each operation o1 within any call sequence, for each parameter p1 of o1
where the level is type1, no other operation o2meeting all the following restric-
tions may exist:
• o2 is deployed in the same location as o1, which is dened via the location
property of both.
• o2 has a parameter p2 which has the level type1, which however has a
dierent datatype than p1.
This constraint ensures, that for no location it is possible that Type-1 data of a dierent
type (and therefore of a dierent source) ows there.
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6. Translation to Prolog
In this section we show how instances of our data ow system meta model can be auto-
matically translated to Prolog programs. These programs can be queried in order to detect
constraint violations in the modeled systems.
We rst introduce our Prolog API for formulating data ow constraint queries in
Section 6.1. Afterwards, in Section 6.2 we illustrate the usage of the API based on examples.
Finally, in Section 6.3 we show how the translation can be realized.
6.1. Constraint Query API
In this section we introduce our Prolog API for formulating data ow constraint queries.
The goal is that after a system has been modeled using our meta model presented in the
previous section, it can be automatically translated to a Prolog program. Using the API we
present in this section, the system can then be queried for constraint violations.
6.1.1. Type Information
The meta model of our approach includes a type system. This type system is useful for
formulating queries for which one would normally use the universal or the existential
quantors. For example, queries starting like “For all operations with property XYZ, . . . ” can
be formulated based on the predicates for the type system. The predicates exposed by our
API for this purpose are as follows:
isProperty(P)
true when P is the name of a Property
isDataType(D)
true when D is the name of a DataType
isAttribute(A)
true when A is the name of an Attribute
isOperation(OP)
true when OP is the name of a Operation
isSystemUsage(SU)
true when SU is the name of a SystemUsage
The names of the elements are dened by the name attribute used in the meta model. They
are used as Prolog atoms. The predicates presented above can be used for both testing
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or as generators. To use them as generators, the predicate just has to be called with an
uninstantiated variable. For example, when calling “isOperation(X)”, the Prolog interpreter
will instantiate X with all available operations.
Both Attributes and Properties have a ValueSetType. The members of a ValueSetType can
be queried using the following predicate:
valueSetMember(T,V)
true when V is the name of a Value which belongs to the ValueSetType with the
name T.
The relation between ValueSetTypes and Attributes and Properties is represented using the
following predicates:
attributeType(A,T)
true when A is the name of a Attribute and T is the name of its ValueSetType.
propertyType(P,T)
true when P is the name of a Property and T is the name of its ValueSetType.
As DataTypes consist of a set of Attributes, their relationship can be queried using the
following predicate:
dataTypeAttribute(D,A)
true when D is the name of a DataType and A is the name of one of its Attributes.
The last part of type system query API is about the parameters, return values and state
variables of Operations. Every Operation has named Variables, of which each one has a
type. This can be queried using the predicates shown below:
operationParameter(OP,P)
true when OP is the name of a Operation and P is the name of one of its parameters.
operationParameterType(OP,P,T)
true when OP is the name of a Operation and P is the name of one of its parameters.
In addition T has to be the name of the DataType of P.
operationReturnValue(OP,R)
true when OP is the name of a Operation and R is the name of one of its return
values.
operationReturnValueType(OP,R,T)
true when OP is the name of a Operation and R is the name of one of its return
values. In addition T has to be the name of the DataType of R.
operationState(OP,ST)
true when OP is the name of a Operation and ST is the name of one of its state
variables.
operationStateType(OP,ST,T)
true when OP is the name of a Operation and ST is the name of one of its state
variables. In addition T has to be the name of the DataType of ST.
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6.1.2. Operations, SystemUsages and Calls
For operations we showed in the previous section how their call and return signature as
well as their state variables can be queried. In this section we introduce how the actual
values of these variables can be referenced for formulating constraints. However, for
this purpose we rst have to introduce the concept of call stacks in Prolog. Consider the






In this example sequence, the invocation chain starts with the SystemUsage Usage. Usage
then calls Operation1. This call is named call1. Operation1 then invokes Operation2 with a
call named call2.
The values of the variables for these calls, namely parameters, return values or state
variables as explained in Section 5.2 are dened via VariableAssignments as introduced in
Section 5.6. These assignments allow variables to depend on parameters, on the return
values of previously invoked Operations or on arbitrary state variables. In tun, these
values can have dependencies on other calls. This implies that the actual value of these
parameters can be dependent on the entire call history.
For this reason, we have to provide the call history as call sequence (also referred to
as call stack) when querying such variable values. We decided to use Prolog lists for
this purpose. The Prolog syntax hereby is optimized for adding or removing the head
of such lists via the “|” operator [3]. This implies that Prolog lists should have similar
timing characteristics as Single-Linked lists in most applications. This makes them ideal
for representing stacks, where the list head is used as stack top.
As we identify model elements from Chapter 5 by using their names as atoms, we can
therefore represent the call sequence shown above using a Prolog list as follows:
[ ’ O p e r a t i o n 2 ’ , ’ c a l l 2 ’ , ’ O p e r a t i o n 1 ’ , ’ c a l l 1 ’ , ’ Usage ’ ]
This list represents the call sequence leading to Operation2 from Usage. Note that we use
single quotes to prevent Prolog from interpreting names starting with upper case letters as
variables instead of atoms. At rst sight the list might seem reversed, as it starts with the
top of the stack. However, this is due to the Prolog notation, where the leftmost element is
the head of the list. In addition it is noteworthy that both the names of the operations as
well as the names of the operations are listed by themselves and not in combination, for
example as tuples. This design choice was made to make the handling of call sequences
easier with the Prolog list concatenation operator.
If we wanted to refer to the call of Operation1, we could use the following list instead:
[ ’ O p e r a t i o n 1 ’ , ’ c a l l 1 ’ , ’ Usage ’ ]
The power of this representation of call stacks becomes visible in combination with the
Prolog “|” concatenation operator. Given for example a call stack list as variable S. The only
thing we know about S is that Operation1 is at the stack top. This means that S represents
an arbitrary call sequence leading to Operation1. In Prolog notation, this means that the
following unication holds:
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S =[ ’ O p e r a t i o n 1 ’ | _ ]
What if we wanted to refer to the call to Operation2 given the previous invocation sequence
S? This is for example useful when dening the call arguments for Operation2 if they are
context dependent. We can now simply formulate this in Prolog using list concatenation:
[ ’ O p e r a t i o n 2 ’ , ’ c a l l 2 ’ , ’ O p e r a t i o n 1 ’ | S ]
This new list refers to the call to Operation2 from Operation1 given the previous call history
S.
With the concept of representing call stacks using lists we now have a mechanism
to unambigously identify variables given their call context. This allows us to dene the
following predicates for querying the values of parameters and return values of our API:
callArgument(S,P,A,V)
true when the Value V of the Attribute A of the parameter P is present given the call
stack S. The operation which owns the Parameter P is dened by the stack top of
returnValue(S,R,A,V)
true when the Value V of the Attribute A of the return value R is present given the
call stack S. The operation which owns the Return Value R is dened by the stack
top of S.
An intuitive interpretation of these predicates can be done by viewing the combination
variable.attribute.value as boolean variable. This view was already introduced in Chapter 5.
For each Operation we dened assignments for this variable. The value of callArgument
or returnValue is now exactly true when the assignment of the corresponding variable
leads to a propositional logic formula which evaluates to true. hereby the full formula
is derived by transitively replacing dependencies to other variables with the help of the
given call sequence.
Both predicates can be called with any of their arguments bound, partially bound
or unbound. Consider that Operation2 has a parameter named le with the Attribute
encryption of which a possible Value is AES. If we want to know all call sequences for
which the le is encrypted, we can use the following query:
?− S =[ ’ O p e r a t i o n 2 ’ | _ ] ,
c a l lArgument ( S , ’ f i l e ’ , ’ e n c r y p t i o n ’ , ’ AES ’ ) .
In this example we partially bind the stack list, as we dene its head but not the tail. The
Prolog interpreter will then provide all instantiations for S, where the le is encrypted
with AES. A special ability of the Prolog solver is that in many cases it does not need to
fully instantiate the stack up to the SystemUsage where the call sequence begins. Instead,
the interpreter might just return the following solution:
S =[ ’ O p e r a t i o n 2 ’ , ’ c a l l 2 ’ , ’ O p e r a t i o n 1 ’ | _ ] .
This solution reads as that for any call to Operation2 from Operation1 the le is encrypted.
It hereby does not matter from where Operation1 was called.
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However, often it can be useful to enumerate all possible call stacks fully instantiated.
For this purpose the following predicate was introduced:
stackValid(S)
true when the list S represents a correct call sequence starting at a SystemUsage.
This predicate can be used for testing or as a generator for call stacks. Extending the
example above to provide a fully instantiated stack works as follows:
?− S =[ ’ O p e r a t i o n 2 ’ | _ ] ,
c a l lArgument ( S , ’ f i l e ’ , ’ e n c r y p t i o n ’ , ’ AES ’ ) , s t a c k V a l i d ( S ) .
S =[ ’ O p e r a t i o n 2 ’ , ’ c a l l 2 ’ , ’ O p e r a t i o n 1 ’ , ’ c a l l 1 ’ , ’ Usage ’ ] .
In this example we only have one call path leading to Operation2 via Operation1, therefore
only one solution is returned. However, if more paths existed, the Prolog interpreter would
list them all.
So far, we presented the predicates for querying call arguments and return values.
In addition we need to dene predicates for accessing state variables. As explained in
Section 5.2, state variables are handled as implicit parameters and return values which are
passed with every call. However, in order to dierentiate between them and normal call
parameters and return values, we decided on introducing separate predicates for them:
preCallState(S,OP,ST,A,V)
true when the Value V of the Attribute A of the state variable ST owned by the
operation OP is present before the call to the operation on top of the call stack S is
executed. The operation OP hereby is completely independent of the stack S.
postCallState(S,OP,ST,A,V)
true when the Value V of the Attribute A of the state variable ST owned by the
operation OP is present after the call to the operation on top of the call stack S is
executed. The operation OP hereby is completely independent of the stack S.
Eectively, these predicates are realized in exactly the same manner as callArgument
and returnValue. preCallState corresponds to callArgument and postCallState cor-
responds to returnValue. The main dierence is that in order to unambiguously identify
state variables, their containing operation is required as additional parameter. This is not
required for return values and call parameters as their containing operation is dened by
the call stack top.
Another unique property of state variables is the fact that they have a default value.
This default value can be queried using the following predicate:
defaultState(OP,ST,A,V)
true when the Value V of the Attribute A of the state variable ST owned by the
operation OP is present by default.
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Note that defaultState is a constant value and therefore does not require a call stack
as parameter.
In addition to these value queries, our API also allows to simply query whether a direct
call from one operation to another one exists:
operationCall(SRC,DEST,CALL)
true when the caller SRC performs a call to the Operation DEST with the name CALL.
Note that in this predicate, the source SRC is a Caller. This means that it can be either an
Operation or a SystemUsage.
The last uncovered aspect is the querying of operation property values. We dene the
following two predicates for this purpose:
hasProperty(OP,PR)
true when the Operation OP contains a PropertyDenition for the Property PR.
operationProperty(OP,PR,V)
true when the PropertyDenition of Operation OP for the Property PR has the Value
V as present value.
6.2. Constraint Formulation Examples
In this section we illustrate based on examples how the introduced API can be used to
formulate queries for data ow constraint violations. We show how the informal constraint
denitions given in Section 5.7 can be formulated in Prolog for the presented examples.
A common approach hereby is to query for constraint violations instead of proong that
the constraint holds. In the case that violations are present, asking Prolog to proof that
the constraint holds would just yield fail as result. Querying for violation instead gives us
an exact context, e.g. a call sequence when the constraint is violated. If no violations are
present, the query for violations will just yield fail as result.
6.2.1. Access Control Scenario
In this section we show how the model presented in Section 5.7.1 can be validated using
our API. In Section 5.7.1.2 we already gave the following informal denition for the access
control constraint:
For each operation owithin any call sequence, for each parameter p of owith the
attribute authorizedRoles, a role rmust exist so that both p.authorizedRoles.r
and o.roles.r are true.
Note that in this denition we solely focus on call parameters which are sucient for
our example model instance. When access control is required on return values or state
variables, the constraint query can be formulated similarly. In addition we assume that
only data with the attribute authorizedRoles and operations with the property roles
underlie access control. This means that for other data and operations by default no checks
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are performed. As previously stated we however do not query that the constraint holds,
but instead we query for violations. This means we query for the negation of the statement
above, which looks as follows:
Does an operation o exist within any call sequence, where for any parameter p of
owith the attribute authorizedRoles, no role r exists so that both p.authorizedRoles.r
and o.roles.r are true.
We can now directly translate this denition to the following Prolog query:
1 ?− i s O p e r a t i o n (OP ) , h a s P r o p e r t y (OP , ’ a c c e s s R o l e s ’ ) ,
2 S =[OP | _ ] ,
3 o p e r a t i o n P a r a m e t e r T y p e (OP , P , PT ) ,
4 d a t a T y p e A t t r i b u t e ( PT , ’ a u t h o r i z e d R o l e s ’ ) ,
5 a c c e s s R o l e s (OP , R ) ,
6 i s N o R o l e A u t h o r i z e d ( R , S , P ) .
At the end, the query uses the helper predicates accessRoles(OP,R) and isNoRoleAu-
thorized(R,S,P) which we will dene later. We will now go over each line step by step
and show how they map to the informal denition of the query from above.
• In line 1 we use isOperation(OP) as generator: Prolog will cycle through every op-
eration in our system and instantiate OP with it. Afterwards we lter for operations
which underlie access control restriction by ensuring that the accessRoles property
is present using hasProperty(OP,’accessRoles’).
• In line 2 we dene that we are interested in any call stack S, which leads to the
current Operation OP.
• In line 3 and 4 we iterate over all call parameters of the operation OP. First in line
3 we use operationParameterType(OP,P,PT) as generator: We cycle through
every parameter of OP, where the name of the parameter is stored in P and its
data type is stored in PT. As we are only interested in parameters which under-
lie access control restrictions, we have to lter for parameters whose type has
the authorizedRoles attribute. This ltering is performed using the dataTypeAt-
tribute(PT,’authorizedRoles’) term.
• In line 5 we query all roles under which OP accesses the data and store it in the list
R.
• In line 6 we check that none of the roles in R is authorized for an access to P.
The accessRoles(OP,R) predicate called in line 5 is dened as follows:
a c c e s s R o l e s (OP , R ) :−
f inda l l ( X , o p e r a t i o n P r o p e r t y (OP , ’ a c c e s s R o l e s ’ ,X ) , R )
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The goal of accessRoles(OP,R) is that given the operation OP, R is the list of all roles
under which OP accesses its data. These roles are dened by the accessRoles prop-
erty. Therefore, we use the built-in predicate ndall, which returns all solutions for
a given query as a list. As query for ndall we use our API predicate operationProp-
erty(OP,’accessRoles’,X).
Finally, in line 6 the predicate isNoRoleAuthorized(R,S,P) is called, which we dene
as follows:
1 i s N o R o l e A u t h o r i z e d ( [ ] , _S , _P ) .
2 i s N o R o l e A u t h o r i z e d ( [ Ro le | R ] , S , P ) :−
3 s t a c k V a l i d ( S ) , \+ ca l lArgument ( S , P , ’ a u t h o r i z e d R o l e s ’ , Ro le ) ,
4 i s N o R o l e A u t h o r i z e d ( R , S tack , P ) .
Given a list of roles R, a call stack S and a operation parameter P, it is dened to return
true if none of the roles in R are authorized to access P. Hereby, this check is performed
for the operation which is on the top of the call stack S. Note that is explicitly not required
for S to be fully instantiated: only the call stack top has to be bound. If the predicate is
successful in nding a violation, S will be instantiated further to contain the call sequence
leading to the violation.
In the denition of isNoRoleAuthorized(R,S,P) the base case is dened in line 1: If
the list of roles is empty, none of the roles can be authorized. In line 2 we recursively iterate
over the list of roles, ensuring that none is authorized. This means that we have to ensure
that for a given Role, the authorizedRoles attribute of the parameter is false. Therefore
we need a logical negation, which is performed in line 3. As explained in Section 2.2.3,
the Prolog negation is only equivalent to a logical negation if all variables of the negated
term are bound. This is already the case for all variables except for the call stack. For this
reason S is bound using stackValid(S) as generator prior to the negation.
Note that this variable binding before the negation can be potentially expensive perfor-
mance wise. For this reason we introduce in Chapter 7 an optimized way of expressing
logical negations.
6.2.2. Geolocation Constraints Scenario
In this section we show how the constraints for our geolocation restrictions example
presented in Section 5.7.2 can be expressed in Prolog. For the example we derived the
following two constraints. First, we presented one for Type-0 data:
For each operation o within any call sequence, for each parameter p of o where
the level is type0, the deployment specied by the location property of o must
be a safe location.
The second constraint was dened for Type-1 data to prevent the problem of joining data
streams:
For each operation o1 within any call sequence, for each parameter p1 of o1
where the level is type1, no other operation o2meeting all the following restric-
tions may exist:
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• o2 is deployed in the same location as o1, which is dened via the location
property of both.
• o2 has a parameter p2 which has the level type1, which however has a
dierent datatype than p1.
Again, data which has no privacy type assigned is ignored in our analysis. If this
behaviour is not desired it is possible for example to dene an additional constraint which
forces data to have type dened. As done previously, we have to negate these constraints
in order to nd violations. For the Type-0 constraint, this leads to the following informal
query:
Does an operation o exist within any call sequence, where for any parameter p
of o the level is type0 and the deployment specied by the location property of
o species an unsafe location.
This denition can now be easily translated to Prolog based on our API:
1 t y p e 0 V i o l a t i o n (OP , P , L ) :−
2 S =[OP | _ ] , c a l lArgument ( S , P , ’ l e v e l ’ , ’ Type−0 ’ ) ,
3 o p e r a t i o n P r o p e r t y (OP , ’ l o c a t i o n ’ , L ) , i s N o t S a f e ( L ) .
In line 2 we dene that we are looking for a call sequence with an operation which has
a Type-0 parameter. Afterwards in line 3, we ensure that the location specied by the
location property is an unsafe location. However, for this to work, we need to specify
which locations we consider as safe and which we consider as unsafe. This is done using
the following statements:
1 i s S a f e ( ’EU ’ ) .
2 i s N o t S a f e (X ) :− valueSetMember ( ’ L o c a t i o n s ’ ,X ) , \+ i s S a f e (X ) .
For our example, we only consider the EU as safe. We dene this using the fact in line 1.
Our denition for the unsafe location is performed in line 2: We dene every location
which is not specied as safe to be unsafe.
The second constraint is more complex because we have to nd a combination of call
sequences which leads to a joining data stream. Negating the denition of the constraint
leads to the following informal denition for nding violations:
Does a combination two operations o1 and o2 exist meeting all the following
restrictions:
• o2 is deployed in the same location as o1, which is dened via the location
property of both.
• o1 has a parameter p1 which has the level type1
• o2 has a parameter p2 which has the level type1, which however has a
dierent datatype than p1.
It is translated to Prolog as shown below:
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1 t y p e 1 V i o l a t i o n ( S1 , P1 , S2 , P2 , L ) :−
2 S1 =[OP1 | _ ] , S2 =[OP2 | _ ] ,
3 o p e r a t i o n P r o p e r t y ( OP1 , ’ l o c a t i o n ’ , L ) , i s N o t S a f e ( L ) ,
4 ca l lArgument ( S1 , P1 , ’ l e v e l ’ , ’ Type−1 ’ ) ,
5 o p e r a t i o n P r o p e r t y ( OP2 , ’ l o c a t i o n ’ , L ) ,
6 ca l lArgument ( S2 , P2 , ’ l e v e l ’ , ’ Type−1 ’ ) ,
7 o p e r a t i o n P a r a m e t e r T y p e ( OP1 , P1 , T1 ) ,
8 o p e r a t i o n P a r a m e t e r T y p e ( OP2 , P2 , T2 ) ,
9 \+ T1=T2 .
In line 2 we dene that we are looking for two call stacks with the operations OP1 and
OP2 on top. In line 3 we dene that OP1 has to be deployed in an unsafe location L and
in line 4 we dene that OP1 has to have a parameter P1 of Type-1. In line 5 and 6 we
dene the same requirements for OP2: It has to be deployed at the same location and also
needs to have a Type-1 parameter P2. In the lines 7 to 9 we dene the nal requirement:
The problem of joining data streams only occurs when P1 and P2 originate from dierent
data sources. We dened that the source is equal when both parameters have the same
Datatype. Therefore we specify in our rule that the types of both parameters have to be
dierent.
6.3. Deriving the Prolog Program
In this section we introduce how a Prolog program can be automatically generated from
a system specied using our meta model from Chapter 5. This program is designed to
conform to the API from Section 6.1.
An overview of the structure of the resulting logical program is given in Figure 6.1.
The rst part of the program is the header section: It starts with a preamble, where the
predicates which are independent of the modeled system are dened. An example for
such a predicate is stackValid(S). Afterwards, the required types of the system, namely
ValueSetTypes, Properties, Attributes and DataTypes are dened as facts. The process of
deriving the header section is explained in Section 6.3.1.
In the following two sections of the program, a block of predicates is generated for
each Operation and SystemUsage. These blocks are especially responsible for dening the
values of parameters, return values and state variables. The generation of these predicates
is explained in detail in Section 6.3.2.
6.3.1. Program Header Definition
The header section of the generated program contains model-independent predicate
denitions as well as the denition of the types specied in the model. For each of the
subsections of the header presented in Figure 6.1, we explain how they are derived in the
following sections.
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Post Execution State Definitions
Figure 6.1.: Illustration of the resulting program structure of our proposed Prolog
translator.
6.3.1.1. Preamble
The header of the generated Prolog program starts with a preamble which is independent
of the generated model. The idea is that several API predicates dened in Section 6.1 can
be derived from existing denitions of other predicates. An example is the isAttribute(A)
predicate: Every Attribute has exactly one ValueSetType assigned as type. This type can be
queried using attributeType(A,T). As we know that each attribute has exactly one type,
we can therefore dene isAttribute(A) in the preamble as follows:
i s A t t r i b u t e (A) :− a t t r i b u t e T y p e (A , _ ) .
The denition of attributeType(A,T) is generated for each Attribute in the Attribute-
Denitions section, which is explained in Section 6.3.1.3.
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The benet of this denition of isAttribute(A) in the preamble is that it reduces the
number of rules required and therefore the total program size: Instead of having one
isAttribute(A) denition as fact for each attribute, only one in the preamble is required.
The same idea is used for the denition of isProperty(P), operationParameter(OP,P),
operationReturnValue(OP,R) and operationState(OP,ST):
i s P r o p e r t y ( P ) :− proper tyType ( P , _ ) .
o p e r a t i o n P a r a m e t e r (OP , P ) :−
o p e r a t i o n P a r a m e t e r T y p e (OP , P , _ ) .
o p e r a t i o n R e t u r n V a l u e (OP , R ) :−
o p e r a t i o n R e t u r n V a l u e T y p e (OP , R , _ ) .
o p e r a t i o n S t a t e (OP , ST ) :−
o p e r a t i o n S t a t e T y p e (OP , ST , _ ) .
The stackValid(S) predicate is also dened in the preamble. We dene a stack as valid
if it meets the following requirements:
• The top of the stack must be an Operation.
• The bottom of the stack must be a SystemUsage.
• Between every called Operation and its Caller there must be the name of the call on
the stack.
Based on these requirements we can easily dene stackValid(S) as follows:
s t a c k V a l i d ( [OP , CALL , SU ] ) :− i s Sys t emUsage ( SU ) ,
i s O p e r a t i o n (OP ) , o p e r a t i o n C a l l ( SU ,OP , CALL ) .
s t a c k V a l i d ( [ DEST , CALL , SOURCE | S ] ) :−
s t a c k V a l i d ( [ SOURCE | S ] ) , o p e r a t i o n C a l l ( SOURCE , DEST , CALL )
The implementation of the predicates used in this denition is explained in Section 6.3.2.






In our implementation of these predicates in Section 6.3.2 we rely on the fact that all
variables except for the call stack S are bound. However, to keep our API as exible as
possible, we do not want to pose this restriction to the user of the API. The solution is to
use corresponding generators for the denition in the preamble:
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ca l lArgument ( [OP | S ] , P , A , V ) :−
i s O p e r a t i o n (OP ) , o p e r a t i o n P a r a m e t e r T y p e (OP , P , T ) ,
d a t a T y p e A t t r i b u t e ( T , A) , a t t r i b u t e T y p e (A , VT ) ,
valueSetMember ( VT , V ) ,
c a l lArgument Imp l ( [OP | S ] , P , A , V ) .
r e t u r n V a l u e ( [OP | S ] , R , A , V ) :−
i s O p e r a t i o n (OP ) , o p e r a t i o n R e t u r n V a l u e T y p e (OP , R , T ) ,
d a t a T y p e A t t r i b u t e ( T , A) , a t t r i b u t e T y p e (A , VT ) ,
valueSetMember ( VT , V ) ,
r e t u r n V a l u e I m p l ( [OP | S ] , R , A , V ) .
. . .
The denition of the corresponding predicates for state variables was omitted here, as it
works in exactly the same manner. Note that in the shown examples we call callArgu-
mentImpl and returnValueImpl after the generators. These predicates are the hidden
implementations we dene in Section 6.3.2. Again, the corresponding denitions for state
variables also delegate to -Impl variants of their predicates.
6.3.1.2. ValueSetType Definitions
ValueSetTypes are exposed through our API only via the valueSetMember(T,V) predi-
cate. The generation of this predicate is trivial: For each ValueSetType in the model, one
valueSetMember(T,V) fact is generated for each of its Values.
For example, the generated code for the ValueSetType role of the TravelPlanner example
model from Section 5.7.1 looks as follows:
valueSetMember ( ’ r o l e ’ , ’ User ’ ) .
va lueSetMember ( ’ r o l e ’ , ’ A i r l i n e ’ ) .
va lueSetMember ( ’ r o l e ’ , ’ Trave lAgency ’ ) .
6.3.1.3. Property and Attribute Definitions
Properties are exposed via the isProperty(P) and propertyType(P,T) predicates. isProp-
erty(P) is already dened in the preamble. Therefore, we just add one propertyType(P,T)
fact for each Property of the model. For the TravelPlanner example this results in the
following code:
proper tyType ( ’ a c c e s s R o l e s ’ , ’ r o l e ’ ) .
The approach for Attributes with the isAttribute(A) and attributeType(A,T) predi-
cates is exactly the same. For this section, the code for the TravelPlanner example is the
following:
a t t r i b u t e T y p e ( ’ a u t h o r i z e d R o l e s ’ , ’ r o l e ’ ) .
a t t r i b u t e T y p e ( ’ c o n t a i n e d R o l e s ’ , ’ r o l e ’ ) .
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6.3.1.4. DataType Definitions
ForDataTypes our API denes the predicates isDataType(D) anddataTypeAttribute(D,A).
Again, these can be generated as facts by iterating over the DataTypes of the model. For
each DataType one isDataType(D) fact is generated. In addition, for each Attribute of the
DataType, one dataTypeAttribute(D,A) fact is added to the program.
The corresponding code for the TravelPlanner example looks as follows:
i sDataType ( ’ Reques tData ’ ) .
d a t a T y p e A t t r i b u t e ( ’ Reques tData ’ , ’ a u t h o r i z e d R o l e s ’ ) .
i sDa taType ( ’ F l i g h t O f f e r s ’ ) .
d a t a T y p e A t t r i b u t e ( ’ F l i g h t O f f e r s ’ , ’ a u t h o r i z e d R o l e s ’ ) .
i sDa taType ( ’ S i n g l e F l i g h t O f f e r ’ ) .
d a t a T y p e A t t r i b u t e ( ’ S i n g l e F l i g h t O f f e r ’ , ’ a u t h o r i z e d R o l e s ’ ) .
i sDa taType ( ’ R o l e S e t ’ ) .
d a t a T y p e A t t r i b u t e ( ’ R o l e S e t ’ , ’ c o n t a i n e d R o l e s ’ ) .
i sDa taType ( ’ C r e d i t C a r d D a t a ’ ) .
d a t a T y p e A t t r i b u t e ( ’ C r e d i t C a r d D a t a ’ , ’ a u t h o r i z e d R o l e s ’ ) .
6.3.2. Definition of Operations and SystemUsages
In this section we show how the meta information about Operations and SystemUsages as
well as their execution semantic is translated to Prolog. The execution semantic is hereby
specied via operation calls as well as the denition of return values and state variables as
explained in Section 5.6.
The translation of SystemUsages is very similar to the translation of Operations. As
already hinted by Figure 6.1, the only dierence is that SystemUsages do not dene return
values or state variables and do not have Properties. For this reason we only explain the
translation of Operations and point out when the translation of SystemUsages behaves
dierently.
As shown in Figure 6.1, each Operation of the model is translated as an independent
block of Prolog statements. This block consists of subblocks for the dened Properties, the
return values, state variables as well as one subblock for each outgoing call.
The denition of an Operation starts with a fact for the isOperation(OP) predicate.
Correspondingly, the denition of a SystemUsage begins with a isSystemUsage(SU) fact.
The dened Properties are accessible through our API via hasProperty(OP,PR) and
operationProperty(OP,PR,V). The code generation hereby works similar as for the type
denitions shown in the previous section: Firstly, for each PropertyDenition of an Opera-
tion a hasProperty(OP,PR) fact is generated. Afterwards, for each of the present Values
of the corresponding Property, a operationProperty(OP,PR,V) fact is added. For the
Airline-bookFlight operation from the TravelPlanner example, the resulting code therefore
looks as follows:
h a s P r o p e r t y ( ’ A i r l i n e −b o o k F l i g h t ’ , ’ a c c e s s R o l e s ’ ) .
o p e r a t i o n P r o p e r t y ( ’ A i r l i n e −b o o k F l i g h t ’ ,
’ a c c e s s R o l e s ’ , ’ A i r l i n e ’ ) .
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After the denition of the Properties every operation denes the default values for its
state variables. The translation of these assignments works exactly the same as for other
assignment based predicates, such as callArgument. We will illustrate the approach
for translating this type of predicates based on the callArgument predicate later in this
section. The reason is that the term used in assignments cannot make use of all types of
LogicTerms while assignments for call arguments can. Default state denitions are not
allowed to reference variables as their value depends on the execution stack.
For each outgoing call of the operation a separate block of code is generated. To
allow the querying the topology of the system, the operationCall(SRC,DEST,CALL)
was introduced. Again, one fact per call is added for the denition of this predicate. In
case of the call from TravelPlanner-bookFlight to Airline-bookFlight, this looks as shown
below:
o p e r a t i o n C a l l ( ’ T r a v e l P l a n n e r −b o o k F l i g h t ’ ,
’ A i r l i n e −b o o k F l i g h t ’ , ’ 2 ’ ) .
Note that the name of the call is 2, as we used in Figure 5.11 numbers instead of names for
the calls.
For each call, it is required that the values of the parameters are specied. This is done
by adding rules for the callArgumentImpl(S,P,A,V) predicate, which we introduced
in Section 6.3.1.1. In our model, the denition of the parameters is performed via the
VariableAssignments in the OperationCall. Given this list of assignments, we generate the
rules as follows: For each parameter of the callee, we add one rule for each combination of
its Attributes with its Values.
As example we again consider the call toAirline-bookFlight from TravelPlanner-bookFlight.
The left sides of the rule denitions then look as follows:
ca l lArgument Imp l (
[ ’ A i r l i n e −b o o k F l i g h t ’ , ’ 2 ’ , ’ T r a v e l P l a n n e r −b o o k F l i g h t ’ | S ] ,
’ f l i g h t ’ , ’ a u t h o r i z e d R o l e s ’ , ’ User ’ ) :− . . .
c a l lArgument Imp l (
[ ’ A i r l i n e −b o o k F l i g h t ’ , ’ 2 ’ , ’ T r a v e l P l a n n e r −b o o k F l i g h t ’ | S ] ,
’ f l i g h t ’ , ’ a u t h o r i z e d R o l e s ’ , ’ Trave lAgency ’ ) :− . . .
c a l lArgument Imp l (
[ ’ A i r l i n e −b o o k F l i g h t ’ , ’ 2 ’ , ’ T r a v e l P l a n n e r −b o o k F l i g h t ’ | S ] ,
’ f l i g h t ’ , ’ a u t h o r i z e d R o l e s ’ , ’ A i r l i n e ’ ) :− . . .
c a l lArgument Imp l (
[ ’ A i r l i n e −b o o k F l i g h t ’ , ’ 2 ’ , ’ T r a v e l P l a n n e r −b o o k F l i g h t ’ | S ] ,
’ ccd ’ , ’ a u t h o r i z e d R o l e s ’ , ’ User ’ ) :− . . .
c a l lArgument Imp l (
[ ’ A i r l i n e −b o o k F l i g h t ’ , ’ 2 ’ , ’ T r a v e l P l a n n e r −b o o k F l i g h t ’ | S ] ,
’ ccd ’ , ’ a u t h o r i z e d R o l e s ’ , ’ Trave lAgency ’ ) :− . . .
c a l lArgument Imp l (
[ ’ A i r l i n e −b o o k F l i g h t ’ , ’ 2 ’ , ’ T r a v e l P l a n n e r −b o o k F l i g h t ’ | S ] ,
’ ccd ’ , ’ a u t h o r i z e d R o l e s ’ , ’ A i r l i n e ’ ) :− . . .
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We will explain later in this section what the right side of the rule denitions looks
like. In the example above, we have the two parameters ight and ccd, which both only
have authorizedRoles as single Attribute. As authorizedRoles has three possible Values, this
yields six rules in total.
Note how we dened the call stack in the rules: The specication of the parameters,
namely its propositional logic formula, solely depends on the call itself. It does not depend
on the previous call history. The actual value however may depend on the previous call
history, for example as it can reference the return value of other calls.
Through our rules we dene the values using their propositional logic formula. For this
reason, we dene the call stack in the rule denitions with our call on top and allow any
valid call history to be stored in the variable S.
To summarize, we now have one rule denition for each parameter, Attribute and Value
combination per call. On the right side of these denitions we want a Prolog representation
for the propositional logic formula of the corresponding tuple.
The propositional logic formulas are dened via the list of VariableAssignments. For
each (parameter, Attribute, Value)-tuple, we select the last matching assignment in the
list. We select the last one in order to implement the override-semantic we specied for
assignments in Section 5.4. Hereby, we have to consider the wildcarding mechanism we
introduced in Section 5.6. An VariableAssignment matches for the tuple, if its wildcards can
be replaced with the given Attribute and Value without violating the typing requirements.
After this selection process, we have exactly one LogicTerm for each (parameter, At-
tribute, Value)-tuple. This term now has to be translated to Prolog to form the right side of
the rule denitions shown above. As LogicTerms form a tree, we translate them to nested
Prolog statements.
First, we explain how the atomic terms are translated. The most basic atomic terms
we have are True and False. These are simply translated to the Prolog statements true
and fail. For example, the value of (rq,roles,Airline) of the call to CreditCardCenter-
requestDeclassiedCCD from TravelPlanner-bookFlight was dened using the following
assignment:
rq.roles.Airline := true
This assignment translates to the following Prolog rule denition:
ca l lArgument Imp l (
[ ’ C r e d i t C a r d C e n t e r − r e q u e s t D e c l a s s i f i e d C C D ’ , ’ 1 ’ ,
’ T r a v e l P l a n n e r −b o o k F l i g h t ’ | S ] ,
’ rq ’ , ’ r o l e s ’ , ’ A i r l i n e ’ ) :− true .
The translation of references to Properties is also simple: We can directly call the
operationProperty(OP,P,V) predicate we specied earlier in this section.
The last types of atomic terms are references to variables. Parameter and return
value references are translated to calls to callArgumentImpl, returnValueImpl. De-
faultStateRefs are translated to calls to defaultStateImpl and StateRefs to pre/postCall-
StateImpl. Whether a StateRef is translated to preCallStateImpl or postCallStateImpl
depends on the context of the current LogicTerm. As explained in Section 5.2 state variables
are realized by passing each of them with operations calls and returns. If now the current
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state for the current LogicTerm originates from an executed call, postCallStateImpl is
used. If the current state was passed to the current operation preCallStateImpl is used
instead.
All variable references except for DefaultStateRefs require a call stack as context infor-
mation. This call stack is derived using the call stack variable dened on the left side of the
assignment predicate denitions. For example, consider we are dening the values for the
call of Airline-bookFlight from TravelPlanner-bookFlight. As shown above, we therefore
have the following list as call stack on the left hand side of the rule denition:
[ ’ A i r l i n e −b o o k F l i g h t ’ , ’ 2 ’ , ’ T r a v e l P l a n n e r −b o o k F l i g h t ’ | S ]
Based on this, the stack representing the call to ’TravelPlanner-bookFlight’ within the same
history can be dened as follows:
[ ’ T r a v e l P l a n n e r −b o o k F l i g h t ’ | S ]
This means, that we can simply reference the call values of ’TravelPlanner-bookFlight’
using the following statement:
ca l lArgument Imp l ( [ ’ T r a v e l P l a n n e r −b o o k F l i g h t ’ | S ] , . . . )
The referencing of return values works similarly: if we want to reference the return
value of the call to ’CreditCardCenter-requestDeclassiedCCD’, we can use the following
statement:
r e t u r n V a l u e I m p l ( [ ’ C r e d i t C a r d C e n t e r − r e q u e s t D e c l a s s i f i e d C C D ’ ,
’ 1 ’ , ’ T r a v e l P l a n n e r −b o o k F l i g h t ’ | S ] , . . . )
Note how we reused in both cases the variable S. When looking for proofs, Prolog will
systematically instantiate S by tracing through our denitions for callArgumentImpl
and returnValueImpl. The denition of the stack works the same way for StateRefs.
Hereby, the stack is used which references the previous value of the corresponding state
variable.
For the compound LogicTerms the denition is much simpler. For And and Or Prolog
already comes with the built-in operators (,) and (;) [3]. For the logical negation Not we
use the Prolog negation by failure \+.
As we explained in Section 2.2.3 the Prolog negation only works as a logical negation if
all variables are fully instantiated. We however often use the call stack S as only partially
instantiated variable. For this reason, the negation of any {Term} is translated as follows:
( s t a c k V a l i d ( S ) , \+ { Term } )
We use stackValid(S) as a generator prior to performing the negation. This ensures that
S is instantiated.
While this approach works, it can come at a severe performance cost: Even though a
proof potentially could be found by inspecting only a few operations at the top of the
stack, this negation results in every stack being examined fully up to the root. For this
reason, we introduce an optimization in Chapter 7 which eliminates the need for using
stackValid(S) as generator prior to negations.
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As the denition of the returnValueImpl predicate works exactly the same as for
the callArgumentImpl, we omit a detailed explanation for it here. At the end of every
Operation, a set of returnValueImpl rules are generated based on the specied Variable-
Assignments in the same manner as the call arguments for outgoing calls are dened.
For state variables, we have three sets of assignments in total: The denition of the
default state, the denition of pre-call state changes and the denition of post execution
state changes. The denition of assignments is done using sets of defaultStateImpl
predicate. Again, the generation works the same way as for callArgumentImpl except
that no variable for the call stack is used. The default state is context independent. As
explained in Section 5.2 state variables are realized by implicitly translating them as
parameters and return values. Therefore, the translation of pre-call state changes works
the same way as the translation of call arguments. Correspondingly the translation of
post execution state changes is realized the same way as the translation of return values.
The main dierence is that each of these assignments have implicit VariableAssignments
for copying the previous state values. For each state variable var of the corresponding
owning operation op in the system the following assignment is added to the pre-call and
post execution state changes:
op.var.*.* := st(op.var.{A}.{V})
The only exceptions hereby are the pre-call state changes of the rst call of every
SystemUsage. There no previous state exists. Therefore the default state is used:
op.var.*.* := dst(op.var.{A}.{V})




In the previous section we introduced our API for formulating constraints and showed
how instances of our meta model can be translated to Prolog. Despite the fact that the
presented translation should work correctly, the analysis can perform badly regarding the
runtime in certain scenarios.
For this reason we introduce several performance optimizations for our approach in this
chapter. Even though the optimizations are presented for our approach, their application
is not limited to it: The ideas on which the optimizations are based on can be used in other
Prolog based approaches as well.
First, in Section 7.1 we show how to enable Prolog to perform rst-argument indexing
on lists in order to allow more ecient call stack based lookups. Afterwards, in Section 7.2
we tackle the problem of logical negations requiring the exploration of the entire variable
space. Finally, in Section 7.3 we remove the need for unrolling VariableAssignments for
each Attribute-Value combination.
We explain analytically in this chapter why we expect performance gains from these
optimizations. These hypothesis are experimentally validated in Chapter 8.
7.1. First Argument Indexing
In Section 2.2.4 we explained how Prolog can perform rst argument indexing on rules: If
the rst argument of a specied rule is an atom the interpreter can use hashing to minimize
the rule lookup time.
Fortunately, this is already the case for most of our generated Prolog rules: The generated
static type information for DataTypes, Attributes and Values all are based on facts which
have atoms as rst argument. The same is the case for Properties as well as the structural
information on Operations, such as the call parameters and return values.
However, we discovered that the indexing currently does not work for predicate lookups
which depend on the call stack. This means, that most Prolog Interpreters perform a linear





For all of these predicates, the call stack represented as Prolog list is used as rst
argument. However, in all of our rule denitions the head of these lists, which represent the
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top of the call stack, is an atom. For example, in the denitions of returnValue(S,R,A,V)
generated by our translator the head of S is always instantiated to the Operation whose
return values are dened. However, we discovered that many Prolog interpreters are
unable to detect this pattern. Therefore, even when returnValue is used in a goal with
the top of the stack initialized, a linear search still is performed for nding matching rules.
This is especially performance critical as the number of denitions of the predicates listed
above scales linearly with the number of operations.
In the following we present our approach for solving this issue using the returnValue
predicate as example. However, the found solution can be applied in the same manner to
all the predicates listed above.
One solution for enabling rst argument-indexing on returnValue(S,R,A,V) is to sim-
ply change the parameter order: We can put the return value R, the Attribute A or the
Value V to the front of the predicate. This does enable the interpreter to use rst argument
indexing because in all rule denitions generated by our translators these values are
instantiated with atoms.
This solution, however, does come with a downside: Both the Attribute and the Value
are commonly reused: As a result it can be expected, that in a large system very many
returnValue denitions occur with exactly the same values for the Attribute and the
Value. If these are used as keys for the rst argument indexing, this leads to very large
hash buckets. Such large hash buckets reduce the gain of the indexing, because then a
long running linear search has to be performed within the corresponding hash buckets.
The same is the case for the return value R: Variable names are often reused in dierent
operations as they commonly document the semantic of the stored values. Again this
leads to large hash buckets when used as rst argument.
For this reason we assumed that it would be best to index by the top of the call stack
S. For the returnValue predicate this would mean that each operations return value
denitions are put together in unique hash buckets. This is a desirable result as especially
in combination with the optimization for shorter assignments we present in Section 7.3
we expect the number of such rule denitions per operation to be relatively low.
As previously stated many Prolog interpreters are unable to index by the head of the
list used as rst argument. The idea to circumvent this is that we simply add a redundant
parameter to our rule denition which enables indexing. Consider the following example
rule denition generated by our Prolog translator:
r e t u r n V a l u e I m p l (
[ ’ op1 ’ | S ] , ’myRV ’ , ’ myAtt ’ , ’ myVal ’ ] ) :− . . .
The idea for our optimization is simple: we just copy the top of the call stack and put it
to the front as a new parameter. This means, that all rules now look as follows
r e t u r n V a l u e I n d e x e d (
’ op1 ’ , [ ’ op1 ’ | S ] , ’myRV ’ , ’ myAtt ’ , ’ myVal ’ ] ) :− . . .
The problem we face with this code generation is that we only dened returnVal-
ueIndexed rules. In our generated code we however reference return values using the
returnValueImpl predicate. For this reason, we have to add the following indexing
resolution rule to the program preamble:
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r e t u r n V a l u e I m p l ( [ T | S ] , R , A , V ) :−
r e t u r n V a l u e I n d e x e d ( T , [ T | S ] , R , A , V ) .
When the Prolog interpreter now has to prove a returnValueImpl goal, it directly
jumps to this indexing resolution rule as it is the only denition for returnValueImpl.
This rule extracts the top of the call stack and then calls returnValueIndexed. On
returnValueIndexed then the rst argument indexing takes place. A benet of this
index resolution rule is that all other aspects of the code generation can be left unchanged.
Especially our API facade presented in Section 6.1 is not touched. In our provided translator
implementation, we implemented this optimization for all of the predicates listed in the
beginning of this section.
7.2. Eicient Logical Negations
We explained in Section 2.2.3 that Prolog does not support a logical negation. However,
we showed how a logical negation can be implemented based on Prologs not-provable
negation operator. For our realization of logic terms we therefore dened the logical not
as follows in Section 6.3.2:
( s t a c k V a l i d ( S ) , \+ { Term } )
As we already hinted, this implementation for logical negations has a very bad worst-
case performance: It is possible that an exponential amount of dierent call sequences
have to be tried when using this approach, even though a proof could normally be found
in constant time. Consider for example that we have the following denition in our code:
r e t u r n V a l u e I m p l ( [ ’ op1 ’ | S ] , ’ rv ’ , ’ a t t ’ , ’ v a l ’ ] ) :− true .
We now want to nd all call stacks to op1, where the Value val of the Attribute att of
the return value rv is false. Obviously, no such call stack exists because of the denition
above. However, when formulated as logical term query the proof can still be very time
consuming:
?− ( s t a c k V a l i d ( [ ’ op1 ’ | S ] ) ,
\+ r e t u r n V a l u e I m p l ( [ ’ op1 ’ | S ] , ’ rv ’ , ’ a t t ’ , ’ v a l ’ ] ) ) .
Even though returnValueImpl([op1|S],rv,att,val]) can never be false, the Prolog in-
terpreter will still try to prove it for every call stack with op1 on top.
Our solution for this problem is to implement a custom logical negation operator lnot.
This means our query from above looks like this instead:
?− l n o t ( r e t u r n V a l u e I m p l ( [ ’ op1 ’ | S ] , ’ rv ’ , ’ a t t ’ , ’ v a l ’ ] ) ) .
Note that there is no more a stackValid statement used as generator. Instead, our




The idea is that we provide the interpreter a way of proong that a statement is false
in the same manner as it currently proves that a statement is true. For example, for each
denition of returnValueImpl such as
r e t u r n V a l u e I m p l ( [ ’ op1 ’ | S ] , ’ rv ’ , ’ a t t ’ , ’ v a l ’ ] ) :− { term } .
we add a dual deniton to the code:
n o t _ r e t u r n V a l u e I m p l ( [ ’ op1 ’ | S ] , ’ rv ’ , ’ a t t ’ , ’ v a l ’ ] ) :−
l n o t ( { term } ) .
.
Note that the actual value of {term} is the same in both denitions. However, for not_-
returnValueImpl it is negated. This means that a query of not_returnValueImpl succeeds
exactly when a query of the corresponding returnValueImpl would fail. Given these dual
denitions, we can now add the following rule to the preamble for resolving lnot predicates:
l n o t ( r e t u r n V a l u e I m p l ( S , R , A , V ) ) :−
n o t _ r e t u r n V a l u e I m p l ( S , R , A , V ) .
When the prolog interpreter now encounters a lnot predicate during its proof, it searches
for a rule to resolve it. Above, we provided a rule for resolving the atomic ReturnValueRef
logical term. For the negation to be fully resolvable for complex terms, we have to provide
such resolution rules for all logical terms we introduced in Section 5.6. For the atomic
terms True and False we simply add the following two rules to the preamble:
l n o t ( true ) :− f a i l .
l n o t ( f a i l ) :− true .
For all other atomic terms such as ParameterRef or PropertyRef the approach is the same as
as for ReturnValueRef : This means for example that for every callArgument denition, we
add a dual not_callArgument denition alongside with a resolution rule in the preamble.
With these rules we are now able to succesfully perform logical negations using lnot on
all atomic terms. However, the compound terms And, Or and Not are not resolvable yet.
To resolve these we use the following basic logical identities:
¬(A ∧ B) ↔ (¬A ∨ ¬B)
¬(A ∨ B) ↔ (¬A ∧ ¬B)
¬¬A↔ A
By repeatedly applying these rules on any complex logical terms, the negations are pushed
towards the atomic terms. When representing logical terms in tree form this means that
the negation are pushed down towards the leafs. If we apply these rules repeatedly until
none is applicable, negations only occur on atoms in the result term.
Fortunately, it is trivial to translate these rules to Prolog:
l n o t ( ( A , B ) ) :− ( l n o t (A ) ; l n o t ( B ) ) .
l n o t ( ( A ; B ) ) :− ( l n o t (A ) , l n o t ( B ) ) .
l n o t ( l n o t (A ) ) :− A .
62
7.2. Ecient Logical Negations
After adding these rules to the preamble, Prolog now automatically performs the push-
down of logical negations when proving negated compound terms. After this pushdown
has been performed, negations only occur on atomic terms. However, for atomics terms
the lnot predicate is already well dened based on our denitions from above.
To further illustrate this mechanism, the following listing shows how Prolog applies
the rules for performing the pushdown of negations:
l n o t ( ( c a l lArgument Imp l ( . . ) ; l n o t ( r e t u r n V a l u e I m p l ( . . ) ) )
%App ly ing l n o t ( ( A ; B ) ) : − ( l n o t (A ) , l n o t ( B ) ) .
( l n o t ( ca l lArgument Imp l ( . . ) ) , l n o t ( l n o t ( r e t u r n V a l u e I m p l ( . . ) ) ) )
%App ly ing l n o t ( l n o t (A) ) : −A .
( l n o t ( ca l lArgument Imp l ( . . ) ) , r e t u r n V a l u e I m p l ( . . ) )
% f i n i s h e d ! now on ly a t omi c t e rms a r e n e ga t e d
With these changes we now have enabled the Prolog interpreter to proof negated terms
exactly in the same manner as it proves non-negated terms. This means we erased the
performance hit of negation at the cost of having one additional dual denition for each
VariableAssignment and a few more rules in our program preamble. As a result, we expect
an increased load time of the program by a factor of two. This is however little cost
compared to that we now prevent the interpreter from running for exponential time for
even simple proofs containing negations.
Note that our introduced lnot() predicate does not act as a universal replacement for
the Prolog negation-by-failure operator “\+”. The dierence is that our negation is limited
to be used to negate combinations of the following predicates:
• The Prolog conjunction with two arguments (,)
• The Prolog disjunction with two arguments (;)
• The lnot predicate, meaning that chains of negations can be resolved
• The Prolog true and fail predicates
• The callArgument and callArgumentImpl predicates
• The returnValue and returnValueImpl predicates
• The preCallState and preCallStateImpl predicates
• The postCallState and postCallStateImpl predicates
• The operationProperty predicate
This set of negatable predicates is sucient to allow the negation of all terms which
can be modeled using LogicTerms. A minor downside of our negation approach is that
when adding new types of terms we also have to add rules for resolving the negation of




i m p l i e s (A , B ) :− ( l n o t (A ) ; B ) .
When the interpreter now encounters negated implications of the form lnot(implies(. . . )),
it will fail as no rule for resolving negations of the implies predicate. Therefore, we have
to add a resolution rule for the negation:
l n o t ( i m p l i e s (A , B ) ) :− l n o t ( ( l n o t (A ) ; B ) ) .
7.3. Cut-Based Assignments
In Section 5.6 we introduced VariableAssignments. They are used for the denition of
all types of variables, such as parameters, return values or state variables. As for a
datatype the number of attribute-value combinations can easily become very high, we
introduced wildcards: with wildcards, we can specify the value of multiple attribute-value
combinations using a single assignment. When used correctly this implies that the number
of required assignments for a single variable is typically much lower than the number of
combinations of all attributes and their values of the variables datatype.
However, during the translation to Prolog shown in Section 6.3.2 this benet is lost.
The translator looks for the matching assignment for every attribute-value combination
and generates one Prolog rule for each. This means that the number of generated rules
can easily become very high, leading to a long loading time of the program. For example
consider that we have a parameter data which has origin as only attribute. origin
hereby is meant to specify the country where the data was acquired. Therefore it has a
ValueSetType which contains one value for each country. If we now want to specify that
data originates from Germany we can use the following two assignments:
data.origin.* := f alse
data.origin.germany := true
However, during the code translation the Prolog translator generates one statement for
every existing country:
ca l lArgument ( . . . , ’ d a t a ’ , ’ o r i g i n ’ , ’ germany ’ ) :− true .
c a l lArgument ( . . . , ’ d a t a ’ , ’ o r i g i n ’ , ’ f r a n c e ’ ) :− f a i l .
c a l lArgument ( . . . , ’ d a t a ’ , ’ o r i g i n ’ , ’ s p a i n ’ ) :− f a i l .
c a l lArgument ( . . . , ’ d a t a ’ , ’ o r i g i n ’ , ’ a u s t r i a ’ ) :− f a i l .
c a l lArgument ( . . . , ’ d a t a ’ , ’ o r i g i n ’ , ’ s w i t z e r l a n d ’ ) :− f a i l .
. . .
c a l lArgument ( . . . , ’ d a t a ’ , ’ o r i g i n ’ , ’ be lg ium ’ ) :− f a i l .
c a l lArgument ( . . . , ’ d a t a ’ , ’ o r i g i n ’ , ’ i t a l y ’ ) :− f a i l .
In the following we introduce a more complex realization of VariableAssignments in
Prolog, which in contrast generates only one statement per assignment.
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As rst observation we make use of the fact that every Prolog interpreter is guaranteed
to examine rules in the order they appear in the Program. For a list of VariableAssignments
we want the last matching to be used. Therefore as initial idea we could translate the
assignments from above simply by using Prolog variables and reversing the order of the
assignments:
ca l lArgument ( . . . , ’ d a t a ’ , ’ o r i g i n ’ , ’ germany ’ ) :− true .
c a l lArgument ( . . . , ’ d a t a ’ , ’ o r i g i n ’ , _V ) :− f a i l .
In the second rule we simply translated the wildcard of the rst assignment as an
anonymous variable. While this approach works for this example, it can easily break as
shown by the next example assignments:
data.authorizedRoles.* := true
data.authorizedRoles.nsa := f ail
This translates to the following rules according to our new approach:
ca l lArgument ( . . . , ’ d a t a ’ , ’ a u t h o r i z e d R o l e s ’ , ’ nsa ’ ) :− f a i l .
c a l lArgument ( . . . , ’ d a t a ’ , ’ a u t h o r i z e d R o l e s ’ , _V ) :− true .
These rules do not have the desired behaviour: When asking the Prolog interpreter for
the value of callArgument(. . . ,’data’,’authorizedRoles’,’nsa’) it yields true instead of the
expected false. This happens because of backtracking: The interpreter encounters the rst
rule which species the value for nsa. However, because this value is fail, the interpreter
scans for the next matching rule, which in turn yields true. In terms of VariableAssignments
this is equivalent to scanning for matching assignments until we nd one for which result
is true.
To summarize, we need a mechanism of stopping the interpreter from backtracking
as soon as he found a rule (representing a single assignment) that matches for the query.
This is exactly what the cut predicate introduced in Section 2.2.2 does. As soon as it is
reached, no other rules are examined even if the current rule yields fail. This means that
we now translate our assignments from above as follows:
ca l lArgument ( . . . , ’ d a t a ’ , ’ a u t h o r i z e d R o l e s ’ , ’ nsa ’ ) :− ! , f a i l .
c a l lArgument ( . . . , ’ d a t a ’ , ’ a u t h o r i z e d R o l e s ’ , _V ) :− ! , true .
This approach now provides the correct results. When querying for the value nsa, the
rst rule is used. There, the cut is reached meaning that no other rule will be examined. As
the rule fails, the result for nsa is fail. For all other roles, the rst rule does not match on
the left side. Therefore, the second rule is used, which also yields the correct result true.
However, this approach is still not fully correct. In Table 5.2 we listed combinations of





In this example the Value germany is part of the ValueSetType geolocation. This
assignment therefore has to be applied only for attributes which also have the ValueSet-
Type geolocation, because otherwise typing errors would be induced. With our current
approach we would translate this assignment to the following Prolog rule:
r e t u r n V a l u e ( . . . , ’ r e t V a l ’ ,A , V ) :−
! , c a l lArgument ( . . . , ’ param ’ ,A , ’ germany ’ ) .
The problem we observe now is that the left side of the rule matches for every Attribute,
even for ones which do not have the geolocation type. As result of this typing error, the
callArgument(. . . ) on the right side will always yield fail as result.
The solution for this problem is to perform type checks before the cut is reached. If these
type checks fail, the Prolog interpreter will continue to scan for the next matching rule. As
shown in Table 5.2, we only have two kinds of type restrictions in fact: either an Attribute
has to be part of a certain DataType or it is required to have a certain ValueSetType. In
both cases, the corresponding DataType or ValueSetType is known at translation time
due to static typing. Therefore we can simply use the dataTypeAttribute(D,A) and
attributeType(A,T) predicates we introduced in Section 6.1.1 to perform the type checks.
Now, our example translates fully correctly as follows:
r e t u r n V a l u e ( . . . , ’ r e t V a l ’ ,A , V ) :−
a t t r i b u t e T y p e (A , ’ g e o l o c a t i o n ’ ) ,
! , c a l lArgument ( . . . , ’ param ’ ,A , ’ germany ’ ) .
While the left side of the rule still matches for every attribute, the predicate
attributeType(A,’geolocation’) fails for every attribute which does not have the correct
type. As this check is performed before the cut is reached, the interpreter continues to
scan for the next matching assignment.
The nal problem that needs to be resolved is the fact that dierent sets of assignments
can interfere with each other. Consider for example that we have two calls to the same
operation:
%Ca l l t o op1 from s r c 1
ca l lArgument ( [ op1 , c1 , s r c 1 | _ ] , ’ a rg ’ ,A , V ) :− ! , true .
%Ca l l t o op1 from s r c 2
ca l lArgument ( [ op1 , c1 , s r c 2 | _ ] , ’ a rg ’ ,A , V ) :− ! , true .
We now want to nd all call stacks for which the value germany of the attribute geolo-
cation is true. Therefore, we execute the following query:
?− ca l lArgument ( S , ’ a rg ’ , ’ g e o l o c a t i o n ’ , ’ germany ’ ) .
The interpreter now nds S=[op1,c1,src1,. . . ] as the only solution. This is not correct
because S=[op1,c1,src2,. . . ] is a valid solution too. This happens because the cut from
the denition of the call arguments from src1 prevents the interpreter from scanning for
additional solutions. This problem can be solved by moving each group of assignments to
a separate predicate which is called as sub goal:
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%Ca l l t o op1 from s r c 1
ca l lArgument ( [ op1 , c1 , s r c 1 | _ ] , ’ a rg ’ ,A , V ) :−
a s s i g n m e n t s _ 1 ( ’ a rg ’ ,A , V ) .
a s s i g n m e n t s _ 1 ( ’ a rg ’ ,A , V ) :− ! , true .
%Ca l l t o op1 from s r c 2
ca l lArgument ( [ op1 , c1 , s r c 2 | _ ] , ’ a rg ’ ,A , V ) :−
a s s i g n m e n t s _ 2 ( ’ a rg ’ ,A , V ) .
a s s i g n m e n t s _ 2 ( ’ a rg ’ ,A , V ) :− ! , true .
As we generate a separate subgoal assignments_x for each group of assignments, the
eects of cuts are guaranteed to be local for each assignment set. The cut now prevents
backtracking within the assignments_x predicate, but not for the callArgument(. . . )
query. Executing the query from above now correctly gives both solutions.
To summarize this optimization, the following steps have to be taken to generate correct
rules for a set of VariableAssignments for a single variable:
• For each set of assignments a unique predicate assignments_x is generated and
used for the denitions. The predicate for which the assignments are performed (e.g.
callArgument or returnValue) call this predicate as subgoal.
• The order of the assignments has to be reversed. This ensures that the assignment
with the highest priority appears rst in the code.
• If the Attribute or the Value of the assignment are wildcards, Prolog Variables are
used in their place. If these wildcards are not referenced on the right side of the
assignment, anonymous variables are used.
• The pattern {type restrictions},!,{logic term} is used for the right side of each
generated rule:
– The type restrictions are generated using dataTypeAttribute(D,A) and
attributeType(A,T) according to Table 5.2.
– The cut is used to prevent the interpreter from backtracking when a matching
assignment was found.
– The logic term generation is left unchanged. The only dierence is that the
introduced Prolog variables are used at places where wildcards are referenced.
With this approach we now generate exactly one Prolog rule per VariableAssignment




In this chapter we evaluate our proposed approach. Firstly, we introduce the goals of the
evaluation and the resulting research questions in Section 8.1. Afterwards in Section 8.2
we explain the evaluation design we use for answering the research questions. The results
are then given in Section 8.3. In Section 8.4 we show the threats to the validity of our
evaluation. Finally, in Section 8.5 we discuss the assumptions and limitations of our
approach.
8.1. Goals and Questions
The general goal of the evaluation of this thesis is to examine how well the combination
of our proposed meta-model (Chapter 5) and the Prolog Translator (Chapter 6) perform
regarding accuracy, scalability and genericness. To quantify this, we apply the Goal-
Question-Metric approach [1]. In this section we introduced the corresponding goals
alongside with their research questions. The metrics are introduced separately for each
goal in Section 8.2.
In order to derive the goals it is required that we rst specify our expectations regarding
our approach. In terms of functionality, our approach is primarily designed for detecting
data ow constraint violations for two main scenarios. The two main scenarios are access
control and geolocation based ow restrictions as presented in Chapter 3. However, while
our approach was designed with these scenarios in mind, we still aimed to keep it as
generic as possible for being applicable in additional scenarios.
A central additional requirement we impose on our approach is a good performance
and scalability. In order for our approach to be as applicable as possible, it is required
that it provides analysis results in a timely manner. In order to achieve this, we proposed
several performance optimizations in Chapter 7. Therefore another central aspect of the
evaluation is to examine the eectiveness of the proposed optimizations.
Based on these requirements regarding our approach, we can identify the following
three evaluation goals:
G1 Evaluate whether our approach enables the accurate analysis of data ow constraint
violations in access control and geolocation based restrictions scenarios.
G2 Examine how well the translation and analysis scale with the size of the model as
well as the eectiveness of the proposed optimizations.
G3 Examine how well our approach is suited for the analysis of data ow constraints
other than access control and geolocation based privacy restrictions.
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With G1 we evaluate the functional accuracy of our approach. As it is hard to prove
that a software system is fully correct, we focus on the accurate handling of our two main
scenarios. In addition we need to ensure that our proposed performance optimizations do
not inuence the accuracy of our approach. This leads to the following research questions
which allow an experimental evaluation:
RQ-1.1 Does our approach accurately detect access control violations for the TravelPlanner
example?
RQ-1.2 Does our approach accurately detect data ow violations for the shop example?
RQ-1.3 Does any of the performance optimizations inuence the accuracy of the analysis?
In these research question we assume that our approach functions accurately when it
nds all constraint violations without returning false positives. In order to experimentally
evaluate these questions we add specic violations to our example models before analysing
them. Details can be found in Section 8.2.2.
The scalability analysis of our approach G2 is performed regarding two aspects. Firstly
we examine how well the Prolog Translator as well as the Prolog analysis scale with the
size of the model. Secondly, we evaluate the eectiveness of our proposed performance
optimizations.
For the rst aspect we identied the following research questions:
RQ-2.1 How well does our approach scale with an increasing number of operations at
constant callgraph complexity?
RQ-2.2 How well does our approach scale with an increasing callgraph complexity?
RQ-2.3 How well does our approach scale with an increasing number of call parameters
and return values per operation?
RQ-2.4 How well does our approach scale with an increasing number of attribute-value-
combinations?
RQ-2.5 How well does our approach scale with an increasing number of properties and
property denitions?
We identied these research questions based on in which dimensions instances of our
meta-model are explicitly scalable given a base model. These dimensions can be scaled
automatically without changing the semantic of the model instance. Other dimensions,
such as the number of variable assignments are scaled indirectly through these dimension.
Even though variable assignments are a central aspect of our approach, they cannot
be scaled automatically without altering the semantic of the model. The scaling of the
callgraph complexity for RQ-2.2 means that we scale the length of the paths the Prolog
interpreter has to instantiate to nd variable values. For each research question we perform
an analysis with multiple combinations of optimization congurations. For RQ-2.3 the
question may arise how practically relevant it is to scale the number of parameters and
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return value per operation. Usually, operations are comparable to functions in the modeled
system which on average have a low, constant number of parameters. However, in our
approach we introduced state variables. As explained in Section 5.2 state variables are
eectively realized using the same mechanisms as parameters and return values. Therefore
we assume that we can quantify the impact of state variables by scaling the number of
parameters and return values for each operation.
The second aspect of G2 is the evaluation of the eectiveness of our optimizations. As
we introduced three dierent optimizations, this leads to the following reasearch questions:
RQ-2.6 How does the rst argument indexing optimization aect the performance of our
approach?
RQ-2.7 How does the logical negation optimization aect the performance of our approach?
RQ-2.8 How does the cut-based assignments optimization aect the performance of our
approach?
To answer these questions, we use the experiments from RQ-2.1 to RQ-2.5 as indicators
for the average case performance. However, we provided a theoretical motivation of the
performance problem that is tackled for each optimization in Chapter 7. In order to
evaluate the hypothesis of these performance problems, we also measure specialized
model instances where we provoke the expected performance problems. These can be
seen as best-case for the eectiveness of the proposed optimizations.
For the last goal G3 an experimental evaluation is dicult to achieve. We therefore
decided to evaluate this goal argumentation based. For this purpose we performed addi-
tional research in order to nd additional data ow constraint scenarios. This lead to the
following research questions, where each refers to a found scenario class:
RQ-3.1 Is our meta-model capable of expressing information ow constraint scenarios?
RQ-3.2 Is our meta-model capable of expressing data secrecy and integrity constraint sce-
narios?
RQ-3.3 Is our meta-model capable of expressing data lifecycle constraint scenarios?
Details on how we identied these scenario classes can be found in Section 8.2.4. In
order to answer these questions, we discuss which features of our meta-model can be used
for modeling the specic characteristics of each scenario class.
8.2. Evaluation Design
In this section we explain how we plan on answering the research questions we introduced
in Section 8.1. The experiments are dened for each goal separately in Section 8.2.2 to
Section 8.2.4. Prior to this, we introduce the randomized call graph scaling technique in
Section 8.2.1 as it is used for the experiments. Finally, we explain our choice of Prolog




8.2.1. Randomized Call Graph Scaling
In order to maximize the informative value of RQ-1.1 and RQ-1.2 it is required that we
execute our approach on many dierent model instances for each scenario. However,
we decided that manually dening semantically equivalent models for our base models
introduced in Section 5.7 is too time consuming for this thesis. Instead, we designed a
method for automatically generating models with a randomized topology given a base
model: the randomized call graph scaling.
The goal of this method is to alter the call graph of the given model without inuencing
the expected analysis results. This means that we change the calls between operations.
However, to preserve the semantic of the model it is required that the data ows remain
the same: If data ows from a certain operation to another one in the original model, the
same ow has to be present in the derived scaled model. However, the ow may happen
























Figure 8.1.: Basic structural change actions for call graph scaling.
To achieve this, we rst dene two basic structural change actions which can be applied
to any model instances. We dene these actions so that the data ow is preserved while
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the call graph topology is changed. By repeatedly applying these change actions we can
then derive highly randomized model instances.
The two change actions are illustrated in Figure 8.1. Firstly, we dene the Mediator
Randomization. For this change we chose a random call to a random operation. Given this
call, we insert a generated operation, which is named GenOp in Figure 8.1. The original
call is then replaced with a call to and a call from GenOp. The original caller calls the
generated operation and the original callee is the only operation called from GenOp. The
key point is the fact that GenOp copies the parameter and return value signature of the
callee. This makes it possible that GenOp simply passes the data through: GenOp denes
the call arguments for the outgoing call by simply copying its input parameters. Similarly,
the return value is dened by copying the values returned by the callee. This way, the
original data ow is preserved.
The insertion of mediator operations alone is not sucient for a good randomization of
the call graph topology: Edges are simply replaced by chains of operations, however no
new branching occurs. For this reason we dene an additional structural change action,
the Branching Randomization. For the rst part it is similar to the Mediator Randomization:
We generate a new operation which we name GenOp in the example. Instead of the
original callee this operation receives the call parameters from the caller. In contrast to the
Mediator Randomization GenOp does not call the callee. Instead, GenOp simply returns its
input parameters unchanged. These returned values are then used by the caller to call
the original callee. Again, the original data ow is preserved. The dierence is that we
introduced a branch: The single original call was replaced by two outgoing calls.
The randomized call graph scaling now works as follows: We select a random call in the
model. Then we either apply the Mediator Randomization or the Branching Randomization,
either one is chosen equally likely. Afterwards we chose another random call and repeat
the process. The number of repetitions denes the size of the randomized model: If we
apply 100 change actions, the resulting model has 100 more operations than the original
model. As each individual change action preserves the data ow, the data ow is also
preserved in the resulting model.
8.2.2. G1 - Accuracy
In order to answer RQ-1.1 and RQ-1.2 we perform an experimental evaluation where
we apply our approach in order to detect data ow constraint violations. Hereby, we use
the models we presented in Section 5.7 in combination with the presented analysis from
Section 6.2. However, these models do not contain any constraint violations. For this
reason it is required that we inject violations in order to evaluate our analysis. We decided






























































Figure 8.2.: System model of the TravelPlanner case study with violations injected. The changed parts in comparison to Figure 5.11 are
highlighted in red. The assignments of the call chain of TravelPlanner-getFlightOers are unchanged and have been omitted




For our shop scenario (Figure 5.12) which is an example for geolocation based restric-
tions the injection of violations is simple. We just need to alter the deployment of some
operations which is specied via properties. In order to keep the violations representative
it is required that we inject one violation for each privacy type we presented in Section 3.2.
Therefore we choose the following violations:
1. The location property of UserDB-store is changed from EU to US. This operation
receives CustomerInformation, which is personal information. As we dened that
only the EU is a safe location, we therefore induce a type-0 violation as described in
Section 3.2.
2. The location property of RecommSys-getRecommendations and RecommSys-update is
changed from US to Asia. This is a redeployment from one unsafe location to another
unsafe location. However, LogDB-store is already deployed in Asia. RecommSys-
getRecommendations and LogDB-store both have type-1 data as input, but their inputs
have a dierent sources. We therefore injected a type-1 violation due to joining data
streams.
Note that in our analysis this root violation manifests as two violations in the
Prolog analysis results: There are two dierent call stacks which call LogDB-store:
one via ShopServer-viewProduct and one via ShopServer-buy. Both call stacks lead in
combination with a call stack to RecommSys-update type-1 violations in our specied
analysis.
For the TravelPlanner example the choice of model changes is simple. The model
contains two types of data which underlie access control: The selected ight as well as
the credit card data. Therefore we decided on injecting one unauthorized access for each
of these data. As the model changes are more complex, we give an illustration of the
dierences to the original model (Figure 5.11) in Figure 8.2. The two induced violations
are as follows:
1. The user does not declassify the CCD for the Airline role. This is realized by changing
the return value assignment of User-askForCCDDeclassication. However, the CCD
is still passed to Airline-bookFlight via TravelPlanner-bookFlight. As the Airline is
not allowed to access the CCD this is an access control violation.
2. The new operation TravelAgency-notify is added. This operation is called to let the
TravelAgency know which ight was chosen by the user, for example in order to
improve the marketing. TravelAgency-notify is called by TravelPlanner-bookFlight
with the ight oer which was chosen by the user. However, the TravelAgency
role is not allowed to access the ight oer. Therefore an access control constraint
violation is induced.
Based on these violations we dene four equivalence classes of model instances per
scenario: One for each of the two violations, one without any violations and one with
both violations injected. So far, we only have one model instance per class: For every
class we have the corresponding base model dened in Section 5.7 with the violations of
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the equivalence class injected. In order to improve the informative value we decided on
automatically generating more models for each class given the existing instance. For this
purpose we use the randomized call graph scaling we introduced in Section 8.2.1. The
scaling does not inuence the semantic of the model, as original data ows are preserved.
However, we randomize the topological structure of the call graph of the models. Therefore
this evaluation approach allows us to make statements about the accuracy of our approach
independent of the topological call graph structure.
To minimize the probability that we just generated model instances for which our
approach works by accident, we decided on generating 100 models for each equivalence
class. These are generated using the randomized call graph scaling given the base models
from Section 5.7 with the violations for the equivalence class injected. The randomized call
graph scaling is executed with 100 iterations, which means that 100 operations are injected
into each model. These numbers were chosen to keep the run time of an experiment low.
With 100 model instances per class all experiments execute in a total time of about two
hours on our experiment system.
It is noteworthy that these equivalence classes where chosen due to the structure of our
used models. Our proposed equivalence classes focus on the analysis of call arguments
according to the denition of the analyses in Section 6.2. This implies that additional
equivalence classes can be constructed based on analysis denitions which examine return
values and state variables. However, in our model instances these analysis are not suited
as we model data ows only through call arguments. An exception is hereby that call
arguments depend on return values. However, as the underlying conceptual mechanism
of call arguments, return values and state variables are highly similar we would not expect
to see dierent evaluation results for these additional classes. Therefore we decided on
only evaluating the four classes proposed above for practical reasons due to the limited
time for this thesis.
To answer RQ-1.1 and RQ-1.2 we now execute our Prolog Translator and the Prolog
analysis with all chosen interpreters. The choice of interpreters is explained in Section 8.2.5.
As result the interpreters return the locations of all found violations, e.g. the call stacks
in combination with parameter names. We compare these detected violations with the
violations that were injected into the model and apply the following classication for each
violation:
• A violation that has been injected into the model and is found by the Prolog inter-
preter is a true positive (tp)
• A violation that is found by the Prolog interpreter but that was not injected into the
model is a false positive (fp)
• A violation that is not found by the Prolog interpreter but that was injected into the
model is a false negative (fn)
• A violation that that neither has been injected into the model nor is found by the
Prolog interpreter is a true negative (tn)
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Given this classication, we can now use precision and recall as accuracy metrics for
each equivalence class. Precision and recall are commonly used metrics for classication
problems. They are dened as follows[22]:
precision =
tp
tp + f p
recall =
tp
tp + f n








Note that these metrics cannot be used for the equivalence classes where we did not
inject any violations. The reason is that the number of true positives for these classes
is zero. Therefore we use the absolute number of false positives as metric for these two
classes.
In chapter 7 we dened three performance optimizations for our translator which could
potentially aect the accuracy. Therefore to answer RQ-1.3 we execute our analysis
pipeline of translator and Prolog interpreter twice for each model of each class for each
Prolog implementation: once with all optimization disabled and once with all enabled.
For the logical negation optimization (Section 7.2) to be used it is required that negations
in the analysis are altered to use the lnot predicate. For the shop example scenario
this is not a problem as no negations are used in the query. However, the analysis
code of the TravelPlanner example presented in Section 6.2.1 needs to be adapted. The
isNoRoleAuthorized predicate contains a negation and therefore has to be changed:
1 i s N o R o l e A u t h o r i z e d ( [ ] , _S , _P ) .
2 i s N o R o l e A u t h o r i z e d ( [ Ro le | R ] , S , P ) :−
3 ( c u r r e n t _ p r e d i c a t e ( l n o t / 1 ) −>
4 l n o t ( ca l lArgument ( S tack , P , ’ a u t h o r i z e d R o l e s ’ , Ro le ) ) ;
5 ( s t a c k V a l i d ( S ) , \ + ca l lArgument ( S , P , ’ a u t h o r i z e d R o l e s ’ , Ro le ) )
6 ) ,
7 i s N o R o l e A u t h o r i z e d ( R , S tack , P ) .
The term current_predicate(lnot/1) is exactly true when the lnot predicate is dened.
Therefore we can use this term to switch between the optimized and the unoptimized
negation based on if the corresponding optimization is enabled.
In total we execute 4800 experiments: we have two scenarios with four equivalence
classes for each where each class contains 100 dierent models. For each model the
analysis is executed for each of the three chosen Prolog implementations twice: once with
all optimizations disabled and once with the optimizations enabled.
8.2.3. G2 - Scalability
A central aspect of the evaluation is the analysis of the scalability of our approach for G2.
Hereby we quantify the impact of the size of the model on the runtime of our approach as
well as the eectiveness of the implemented performance optimization.
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The measurement approach is the same for all research questions of G2. We measure
the time required given an in-memory model instance until all analysis results are available.
This means that we execute the pipeline of our Prolog Translator implementation followed
by the Prolog interpreter loading the resulting program and afterwards executing the
analysis. We measure the timing of each stage, which therefore yields the following
metrics:
• Translation Time: The execution duration for our Prolog Translator implemen-
tation. The input model is assumed to be already present in-memory. This time
includes the IO time required for writing the result program to the disk.
• Load Time: The time required for the Prolog interpreter to load the program from
the disk into its database. Depending on the Prolog interpreter this is the runtime of
the consult/1, load_les/1 or compile/1 predicate.
• Analysis Time: The time required for executing the analysis query after the pro-
gram has already been loaded.
• Total Time: The time required given an in-memory model instance until the analysis
results are available. It is the sum of the translation time, the load time and the
analysis time.
We use a Java implementation for automatically executing the experiments. Hereby,
the Prolog interpreters are accessed through their oered Java interfaces. For measuring
the timings we use the System.nanoTime() method.
With RQ-2.1 to RQ-2.5 we evaluate how our approach scales with the input model
size. For each of these research questions we generate scaled instances of a base model
and execute our pipeline while measuring the timings as explained above. We decided on
using the TravelPlanner model without any constraint violations as base model for these
experiments. We chose the TravelPlanner model over the shop example model because
of its higher analysis complexity: In the TravelPlanner example the variable denitions
induce longer dependency chains. In other words we expect that the Prolog interpreter
is required to instantiate longer call sequence prior to nding values for variables. We
therefore assumed that the TravelPlanner model is better suited for a performance analysis.
In addition we assume that the worst case performance can be observed when no violations
are present in the model. The reason is that then the analysis eectively proofs for the
entire model that no violation exists. If violations are present in contrast the Prolog
interpreter would halt as soon as a violation is found.
Depending on the research question, we scale the base model in a certain dimension by
a parameter n. The scaling per research question is performed as follows:
RQ-2.1 We copy the entire call graph of operations and system usages n-times including
their contained features such as variables, assignments and operation calls. In the
result model we therefore have n disjoint copies of the TravelPlanner scenario which
however do share their data types. This copying ensures that the average call graph
depth for each operation stays constant with n while the total number of operations
to analyse increases linearly.
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RQ-2.2 We scale the model by using the randomized call graph scaling presented in Sec-
tion 8.2.1 with n iterations. This implies that exactly n operations are added to the
model. Note that these added operations are excluded from the analysis: They do
not dene the roles property and are therefore ignored. However, they do increase
the length of the call sequences which need to be instantiated for the analysis of
the existing operations of the TravelPlanner model. To keep the results comparable
across the used Prolog implementations, we use the same randomized model instance
as input for each interpreter.
RQ-2.3 In order to scale the number of parameters and return values while keeping their
usage realistic we decided to copy each operations parameters and return values
n times. Hereby not only the variables are copied but also their assignments. As a
result we get n sets of variables, where the assignments within each set only refer
to variables within the same set.
RQ-2.4 For scaling the number of attribute-value combinations we found that two ap-
proaches for scaling the model size are feasible. As rst approach it is possible to add
a single new ValueSetType with n values. In addition one new attribute is generated
and this attribute is added to every data type. Based on our scenario examples we
would expect to see a high but constant number of values per ValueSetType in a real
world scenario. For this reason we use the following scaling approach: We generate
n new ValueSetTypes with 100 values each. For each generated type, a new attribute
is generated and added to every existing datatype.
RQ-2.5 For scaling the number of properties we chose a similar approach as for the scaling of
the number of attribute-value combinations. Again we generaten new ValueSetTypes
with 100 values each. For each type we then dene a new property. A new property
denition is added for each generated property to each operation. Hereby, the
present values are chosen randomly, where each value has a 50% chance of being
present. So on average 50 values are dened for each property denition.
In addition to measuring the scaling of our approach with the model size we also want
to quantify the impact of the performance optimizations we introduced in Chapter 7. We
therefore execute all experiments on each Prolog implementation with all optimizations
enabled as well as with all optimizations disabled. To ensure that the negation optimiza-
tion is properly used when enabled we use the adapted analysis query we presented in
Section 8.2.2. This way we can measure the impact of all optimizations combined on the
runtime. However, as we also nd it desirable to see the impact of each optimization
individually, we decided on performing three additional experiments per model where
each of the optimizations is enabled individually.
As we are measuring timing information which potentially has a high variance we
decided on running each experiment ten times. We can then use the mean measured time
in combination with the observed standard deviation to asses the results.
With the experiments for RQ-2.1 to RQ-2.5 we measure the scalability of our approach
with the size of the input model. Hereby, we also measure the impact of our performance
optimizations on a model which we consider to be a representative use case. However,
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our performance optimizations target specic scenarios which introduce performance
problems. In Chapter 7 we theoretically explained why we expect the optimizations
to improve the run time of our approach in these scenarios. In order to evaluate these
theoretical assumptions and therefore to give a more detailed answer for RQ-2.6, RQ-2.7
and RQ-2.8 we perform additional experiments on minimal models where we inject the
performance problems. These experiments allow us the evaluate if our optimizations are
eective in their expected best-case in contrast to the average case which we evaluate
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d.isPersonalInformation.isTrue := false
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Figure 8.3.: Model used for performance testing of the indexing optimization. The number
of paths to the process operation scales linearly with n
The minimal model we use for the performance measurement of the indexing opti-
mization (Section 7.1) is shown in Figure 8.3. The only used DataType in the model is
called Data. It contains two attributes: isPersonalInformation and isEncrypted. Both are
boolean variables and therefore use a ValueSetType with only the single Value isTrue. The
main operation of the model is process. This operation takes a parameter of the type Data,
encrypts it and then returns the encrypted datum. The process operation is called through
a chain of operations which can be linearly scaled by the scaling parameter n. This chain
is started by the system usage, which initializes the datum to be unpersonal, unencrypted
information. The chain of operations does nothing but assign the datum through to the
process operation.
The analysis query we now use for this model for answering RQ-2.6 is the following:
1 l i n e a r D e p e n d e n c y ( S ) :−
2 S =[ ’ p r o c e s s ’ | _ ] ,
3 r e t u r n V a l u e ( S , output , ’ i s P e r s o n a l I n f o r m a t i o n ’ , ’ i s T r u e ’ ) .
This query tries to look for a call path where personal information is passed to process.
Such a path does not exist. However to detext this the Prolog interpreter has to trace back
along the chain of operations to the system usage. This means that about O(n) predicate
lookups of callArgument have to be performed. As the number of callArgument
denitions also grows linear with the number of operations, we expect each lookup to
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take O(n) time when the rst argument indexing optimization is not enabled. If it is
enabled, we expect to see a lookup time per operation of O(1) instead. This means that
with the optimization enabled we expect a total analysis time in O(n) whereas without the
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Figure 8.4.: Model used for performance testing of the negation optimization. The number
of paths to the process operation scales exponentially with n
For answering RQ-2.7 we use a very similar model which is shown in Figure 8.4. The
model is exactly the same except for one dierence: the operations in the call chain to
process call their successor twice. The datum that is passed is still left unchanged. This
small change now causes the number of call paths to process to grow exponentially. For
measuring the impact of the negation optimization (Section 7.2) we use the following
analysis query:
1 cons tantDependency ( S ) :−
2 S =[ ’ doSomething ’ | _ ] ,
3 ( c u r r e n t _ p r e d i c a t e ( l n o t / 1 ) −>
4 l n o t ( r e t u r n V a l u e ( S , output , ’ e n c r y p t e d ’ , ’ i s T r u e ’ ) ) ;
5 ( s t a c k V a l i d ( S ) ,
6 \+ r e t u r n V a l u e ( S , output , ’ e n c r y p t e d ’ , ’ i s T r u e ’ ) ) ) .
With this query we look for a call stack where process returns an unecrypted datum.
This is of course impossible as process always encrypts datum. However, due to the way
the logical negation is implemented if the negation optimization is disabled, the interpreter
has to inspect all paths to process to proof this. In this case we therefore expect to see an
analysis time in O(2n). When the negation optimization is enabled, we instead expect that
the interpreter only needs to trace back one call from process to encrypt to nd the proof.
Therefore, with the negation optimization enabled we expect to see an analysis time in
O(1).
In contrast to the other two optimizations, the cut-based assignments optimization
(Section 7.3) we evaluate in RQ-2.8 aims to improve the load time instead of the analysis
time. For the best case of this optimization no additional experiments are required, as
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the model scaling for RQ-2.4 already covers the best case. We expect the optimization to
perform best when the number of attribute-value combinations grows while the number
of assignments remains constant. This is exactly what we do in the model scaling for
RQ-2.4. Therefore we can use these experiments to answer RQ-2.8.
8.2.4. G3 - Genericness
For the goal G3 we want to analyse our approach for further applications. Our approach
was designed with two scenarios in mind: the access control scneario and the geolocation
based restrictions scenario which we both explained in Chapter 3. However, we tried to
keep our approach as generic as possible in order to also be applicable for other scenarios.
For this reason we decided to answer G3 by nding additional types of scenarios which
can be modeled and analysed using our approach.
For nding additional scenario types we performed a literature research. We performed
a keyword based search with keywords which are related to data ows and their typical
potential risks. The keywords we chose are “data ow”, “security” and “privacy”. We
performed our search on Google Scholar with an disjunctive linkage of these keywords on
the 3rd of September. As the focus of the thesis and the evaluation lies on the scalability
and not the genericness, we decided to stop when we nd three additional scenario
types. For each found scenario type we analyse the applicability of our approach via the
corresponding research questions RQ-3.1, RQ-3.2 and RQ-3.3. In this section we explain
the key characteristics we extracted from the found scenario types. The research questions
are answered in Section 8.3.3 where we analyse how these key characteristics can be
modeled using the features of our approach.
RQ-3.1 The rst scenario type we discovered is information ow control. It is closely related
to the access control scenario we presented in Section 3.1. Two traditional models
of this type are the Bell-La-Padula model [2] as well as the Brewer-Nash model [5].
Both are also access control models: They restrict the access to data based on the role
of the accessing entity as well as the congured accessed rights of the accessed data.
In its original form the Bell-La-Padula model hereby manages the access to les, it
however can be used for any type of data other than les. In addition to restricting
the read access to data, both models try to prevent unwanted information leakage.
In the Bell-La-Padula model every datum has a classication level assigned, for
example public, secret and topsecret. The model now prevents information leakage
by restricting write access based on previously read data. For example, if a secret
datum was read by a user, the user is not allowed to write to public data anymore:
the user could potentially leak secret information. The Brewer-Nash model has a
similar mechanism, it however does not classify the data but instead directly models
conicts using a relation.
RQ-3.2 The second scenario type focuses on the concept of secrecy and integrity of data.
Both have been identied as crucial properties of data ows in certain scenarios
[21] and are also covered by UMLSec [16]. The concept of secrecy ensures that no
or only limited information can be extracted from data if one does not posses a key
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to it. In practice, secrecy is realized using encryption schemes. The goal of integrity
is to ensure that data is not modied or corrupted without being detected when
transmitted from a sender to a receiver. This is most commonly realized using digital
signatures, which also ensure authenticity: When data is received alongside with a
signature, the receiver can check if the datum was sent by a certain sender. However,
other mechanism are also usable for achieving secrecy and integrity, such as for
example using a physically secure link which cannot be accessed by an adversary.
The goal of a data ow analysis therefore would be to ensure that sensitive data is
securely transmitted from its sender to its receiver. Hereby, it is required that for
every hop the data takes one of the mechanism is active.
RQ-3.3 The third scenario type is about restrictions regarding the life cycle of managed data.
This is especially considered important for data containing personal information
[21, 6]. Hereby we focus on a crucial part of the lifecycle, the deletion of the data.
Depending on the type of data a person gives to the software system, dierent rules
may apply on how long the data is allowed to be stored. Data may for example
be persisted for the duration of a session, for a certain time span or may not be
persisted at all and only processed. Such rules can already be illustrated based on a
simple online shop: If we consider the checkout process in a shop, it is common that
multiple steps are performed during the checkout: the user enters his address and
afterwards the payment method. This is often realized through separate forms which
are sent to the server of the shop. Initially, the sent address may only be persisted for
the duration of the user session: The user has not completed the checkout process
yet and therefore the shop is not allowed to persists personal information. However,
when the user submits the checkout, the data needs to be persisted for a longer time:
It is required for example to handle warranty cases.
8.2.5. Prolog Implementations
The Prolog code which is generated by our Prolog Translator as explained in Chapter 6
only uses ISO Prolog features. For this reason, theoretically any ISO compilant Prolog
implementation can be used. We selected the following three implementations:
• SWI-Prolog (64 bit, Version 7.6.4) [29]
• ECLiPSe (Version 7.0) [9]
• JIProlog (Version 4.1.6.1) [14]
Firstly, this choice was made for practical reasons: To answer our research questions
it is required that a very high number of experiments with varying inputs is executed.
Therefore, an experiment automation is required, which includes the execution of the used
Prolog interpreter. All of the implementations listed above oer a Java interface through
which the interpreter can be controlled and queries can be executed. These interfaces
therefore allow an automated experiment execution.
Secondly, SWI-Prolog and ECLiPSe were chosen as they both implement more sophisti-
cated predicate indexing algorithms than only rst argument indexing [30, 26]. Therefore
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they are especially interesting for the scalability evaluation performed for G2. In contrast,
JIProlog was chosen with the practical applicability of our approach in mind. JIProlog is a
cross-platform Java-only implementation of Prolog. Whereas the other two implementa-
tion require an installation to the system prior to usage, JIProlog is available as a single,
standalone jar le which does not require an installation.
8.2.6. Experiment System Specification
All experiments are executed on a Lenovo Thinkpad P51. The relevant hardware specica-
tion of it are as follows:
• CPU: Intel Core i7-7820HQ CPU (2.9 Ghz, 4 Cores, 8 Logical Cores)
• RAM: 32 GB
• Disk drive: Samsung MZVLW1T0HMLH 1Tb solid state disk
The system uses Windows 10 (64-bit) as operation system. All experiments are executed
with power plugged in to prevent CPU throttling. The installed Java Runtime Environment
is OpenJDK 1.8.0.161 (64-bit). For all experiments the JVM is started with 4gb starting and
maximum heap memory.
8.3. Results
In this section we present the results of our evaluation. In Section 8.3.1 to Section 8.3.3 we
answer the research question for G1, G2 and G3. Afterwards, we summarize and discuss
the results in Section 8.3.4.
8.3.1. G1 - Accuracy
As result for the accuracy experiments as presented in Section 8.2.2 we can state that
our approach correctly detects all covered violations for both the access control and the
geolocation restrictions scenario with our used models. For all equivalence classes where
we injected at least one violation we observe a precision and recall of 100%. Therefore the
F-Score also is 100%. This value was observed with all optimizations enabled as well as
with all disabled. We can therefore state that for these classes of models our approach nds
exactly the present constraint violations without returning false positives independent of
the callgraph topology.
For the model classes where we did not inject any violations we observed zero false
positives. Again this was observed with all optimizations enabled as well as with all
disabled. Therefore we can also state that for this classes of models our approach works
accurately. In addition we found that the performance optimizations do not have an impact
on the analysis results in the investigated cases.
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8.3.2. G2 - Scalability
For the analysis of the scalability (G2) we performed 245 measurement series. As an
in-depth analysis of the results of each measurement would be out of scope of this thesis
we use the following approach for answering the research questions: In this section we
only show a selection of measurement results. In addition we provide the plots of all
other experiments in Appendix A. Our selection is made based on similarities across the
measurements. When we observe the same scaling behaviour across multiple interpreters,
only the plot for one is shown. The representativeness of the selected measurements can
be traced using the plots given in the appendix. In addition the raw measurement data of
all experiments as well as all plots have been archived online
1
.
All measurements results are presented as line plots of the average measured time. In
addition, vertical error bars are used to show the observed standard deviation. Therefore
the error bars can be used to analyse the stability of the observed timings. In order to allow
statements about the scalability we also show the Pearson correlation coecient r for each
series in the legend of each plot. The closer the value of the correlation coecient is to
one, the more likely is a linear scaling behaviour of the series. The correlation coecient
is computed based on the mean values given in the plots. As our observed measurement
data only has a low variance we require a correlation coecient greater or equal to 0.995
to assume a linear scaling.
8.3.2.1. Scalability with the number of operations (RQ-2.1)

























Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.990)
Figure 8.5.: Translation time measured for the scaling with the number of operations
(RQ-2.1).
For RQ-2.1 the observed translation time is shown in Figure 8.5. The plot indicates




Hereby, the timing is slightly worse when the negation optimization is enabled. This can
be easily explained due to the fact that more predicates have to be generated in total in
this case.



















Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.996)
Figure 8.6.: Load time of ECLiPSe measured for the scaling with the number of operations
(RQ-2.1).
For JIProlog and SWIProlog the measured load times grow linearly for all optimization
congurations. For ECLiPSe the measured values are shown in Figure 8.6. Here, for the
most congurations also a linear growth can be observed as shown by the correlation
coecient value. The slightly lower correlation coecient value when only the indexing
optimization is enabled can be explained by the variance of the measured timings. However,
when only the negation optimization is enabled, the scaling seems to be super linear for
the observed model sizes. This is only the case for ECLiPSe, the other two interpreters
have a strictly linear growth in load time. All interpreters share the fact that the two best
performing optimization congurations are the ones where the assignments optimization
is enabled: This can be easily explained by the fact that this optimizations reduces the total
number of rules in the program. The absolute impact of the optimizations is dependent on
the interpreter.
We also observed that the analysis time for RQ-2.1 is highly dependent on the chosen
implementation. The analysis time of JIProlog is shown in Figure 8.7 and of ECLiPSe
in Figure 8.8. The observed analysis times of SWIProlog are highly similar to the ones
of ECLiPSe. In all cases we can see the positive impact of the rst-argument indexing
optimization on the analysis time: If this optimization is disabled, a quadratic scaling of
the performance can be observed for all interpreters. With the optimization enabled, our
approach scales much better.
For JIProlog, the scaling is still quadratic for the observed model sizes but with a much
lower constant factor. For ECLiPSe the observed analysis time in contrast is near constant
when the indexing optimization is enabled. An interesting fact that can be observed is
that when only the negation optimization is enabled, the analysis time is worse than
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Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.979)
Figure 8.7.: Analysis time of JIProlog measured for the scaling with the number of opera-
tions (RQ-2.1).




















Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.998)
Figure 8.8.: Analysis time of ECLiPSe measured for the scaling with the number of opera-
tions (RQ-2.1).
without any optimizations. This can be explained by the fact that in our scenario not
many dierent call graph paths exists, which makes the naive negation perform decently.
We assume that the performance hit of the negation optimization can be explained by
the overall larger fact base the interpreter has to maintain. Also it is noteworthy that the
analysis time of JIProlog is much higher than the analysis time of SWIProlog and ECLiPSe.
It is greater by a factor of 50 to 100. This shows that JIProlog is not as much optimized as
the other two interpreters. In addition we can often observe measurement points with a
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very high standard deviation and a slight higher average time for JIProlog. We assume
that this is caused by garbage collection pauses as JIProlog is a pure Java implementation.
8.3.2.2. Scalability with the call graph complexity (RQ-2.2)
For RQ-2.2 we observed highly similar results to the experiments of RQ-2.1. For this
reason we focus on the dierences in this section.



















Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.995)
Figure 8.9.: Load time of ECLiPSe measured for the scaling with the complexity of the call
graph (RQ-2.2).























Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.996)























RQ2.1: No optimizations (r=0.967)
RQ2.1: Indexing optimization (r=0.969)
RQ2.2: No optimizations (r=0.966)
RQ2.2: Indexing optimization (r=0.981)
Figure 8.11.: Comparison of the analysis times of JIProlog with and without the indexing
optimization for RQ-2.1 and RQ-2.2.
Again, the observed translation time seems to scale quadratic with a low quadratic
component as for RQ-2.1. The load time is shown exemplary for ECLiPSe in Figure 8.9.
When comparing it to the load time for RQ-2.1 shown in Figure 8.6 the results are almost
the same. This is also the case for all other interpreters. To summarize, we observe a linear
to quadratic scalability for ECliPSe and a linear scalability for JIProlog and SWIProlog.
The observed analysis time also shows the same behaviour as for RQ-2.1 with two
dierences. Firstly as shown in Figure 8.11 the eectiveness of the indexing optimization
has improved for JIProlog. When it is enabled, now JIProlog also shows a low linear or
near constant scaling of the analysis time. Secondly, we observe a much higher standard
deviation for each model size for each interpreter. This can be explained due to the
randomness of the models: As we applied the randomized call graph scaling, the actual
length of call sequences the interpreter has to inspect is also random. This therefore
induces variance to the observed timings.
8.3.2.3. Scalability with the number of parameters and return values (RQ-2.3)
When only the number of parameters and return values is scaled we can now observe a
linear translation time as shown in Figure 8.12.
This is dierent to the quadratic translation time observed for RQ-2.1 and RQ-2.2
and therefore indicates that there is possibly optimization potential in our translator
implementation. According to our denition of the translation process in Chapter 6 it
should be possible to implement the translation in linear time.
In contrast the load times show no dierent behaviour than in the experiments of
RQ-2.1 and RQ-2.2. Again a linear growth of the load time can be seen in the plots of all
interpreters with the exception of ECLiPSe: for ECLiPSe the load time grows linearly for
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Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.999)
Figure 8.12.: Translation time measured for the scaling with the number of parameters
and return values (RQ-2.3).
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Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.996)
Figure 8.13.: Load time of ECLiPSe measured for the scaling with the number of parameters
and return values (RQ-2.3).
all congurations except when only the negation optimization is enabled. In this case a
super linear load time is observed. The load time of ECLiPSe is illustrated in Figure 8.13.
This is not the case for the observed analysis times: Whereas for all interpreters and
all optimization congurations the analysis time scales either linear or quadratic, the
impact of the performance optimizations has changed. For ECLiPSe the analysis times are
shown in Figure 8.14. The gure shows that the timings scale linearly for all optimization
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Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.998)
Figure 8.14.: Analysis time of ECLiPSe measured for the scaling with the number of pa-
rameters and return values (RQ-2.3).
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Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.971)
Figure 8.15.: Analysis time of SWIProlog measured for the scaling with the number of
parameters and return values (RQ-2.3).
congurations. In addition the dierence of the timings between the optimizations is very
low.
For SWIProlog the results are shown in Figure 8.15. The analysis time of SWIProlog
and JIProlog show almost the same behaviour, with the exception that again JIProlog is
slower by a big constant factor. The observed scalability is dierent than the one observed
for ECLiPSe: all timings scale quadratically. In addition now the chosen optimizations
have a big impact. In these experiments, congurations where the indexing optimization
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is enabled perform the worst. This is an unexpected behaviour as we assumed that the
rst-argument indexing optimization has little to no overhead. A possible explanation
here is that in these experiments it is more benecial to index by the parameter name than
by the operation. Our optimization possibly misleads the SWIProlog just-in-time indexing
to index the operation rst. The best performance is observed when only the assignments
optimization is enabled. For JIProlog this is the other way around. There the indexing
optimization outperforms the assignments optimization.
8.3.2.4. Scalability with the number of attribute-value combinations (RQ-2.4)
When the number of attribute-values combinations is scaled we expect to see the best
performance by the assignments optimization as the number of assignments remains
constant.
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Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.589)
Figure 8.16.: Translation time measured for the scaling with the number of attribute-value
combinations (RQ-2.4).
The positive eect can already be observed for the translation times as shown in
Figure 8.16. When the assignments optimization is enabled, an overall linear growth of the
time can be seen for the observed model sizes. However, when the optimization is enabled
the load time remains nearly constant. As previously mentioned this can be explained due
to the fact that with the optimization enabled one rule is generated per assignment and
not per attribute-value combination.
The smaller number of rules in total also greatly impacts the load time. The load times
of ECLiPSe are shown in Figure 8.17 and the one of JIProlog in Figure 8.18. The timings of
SWIProlog are exactly the same as for JIProlog except that they are faster by a factor of
about 10. For all interpreters we can see a near constant load time when the assignments
optimization is enabled. When it is disabled, we observe a linear growth. The worst
performance can be again observed when only the negation optimization is enabled: For
SWIProlog and JIPRolog the load times grows linearly but with a much greater constant
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Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.998)
Figure 8.17.: Load time of ECLiPSe measured for the scaling with the number of attribute-
value combinations (RQ-2.4).
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Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=1.000)
Figure 8.18.: Load time of JIProlog measured for the scaling with the number of attribute-
value combinations (RQ-2.4).
factor. For ECLiPSe the load time even scales quadratic in this case. Even though the
assignments optimization was primarily designed for reducing the translation and load
time, we can also observe a positive eect on the analysis time.
For SWIProlog the analysis timings are shown in Figure 8.19. Again the scaling behaviour
of the timings is similar to the one of JIProlog, except that this time JIProlog is slower by
factor of 50 to 100. Even though the overall timings are relatively low, a linear growth
can be observed for all cases except when the assignments optimization is enabled. In
this case the timing remains constantly near zero. We expect that this is due to the fact
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Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.986)
Figure 8.19.: Analysis time of SWIProlog measured for the scaling with the number of
attribute-value combinations (RQ-2.4).
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Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.103)
Figure 8.20.: Analysis time of ECLiPSe measured for the scaling with the number of
attribute-value combinations (RQ-2.4).
that SWIProlog performs just-in-time indexing, which therefore is impacted by the total
number of rules. For JIProlog the linear growth can be explained by the fact that JIProlog
is possibly unable to index by attributes and values at all. This would also explain the
much higher constant factor of the timings.
For ECLiPSe the analysis times are shown in Figure 8.20. Here the opposite eect can
be observed: When the assignments optimization is disabled, the analysis time remains
constant at a near zero level. When it is enabled, the observed values vary greatly with
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no observable trend. However, the overall values still remain at a near zero level. To nd
the root cause of this behaviour we expect that it is required to analyse implementation
details of ECLiPSe. As this would be out of scope for this thesis we therefore cannot give
an answer for the reason of this behaviour here.
8.3.2.5. Scalability with the number of property-value combinations (RQ-2.5)
For properties we did not implement a dedicated optimization as we expect them to not
have a great impact on the performance. This hypothesis is evaluated by the experiments
for RQ-2.5.
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Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.842)
Figure 8.21.: Translation time measured for the scaling with the number of properties
(RQ-2.5).
The translation time for RQ-2.5 is shown in Figure 8.21. As expected, all optimization
congurations perform nearly identically. With the exception of a few outliers an overall
moderate linear growth can be observed.
The measured load times are also as expected. For all interpreters and all optimizations
the load time grows linearly with the number of properties. The results are shown
exemplary for ECLiPSe in Figure 8.22. The linear growth can be explained by the linearly
increasing number of operationProperty denitions. Hereby, the constant factor of the
growth is greater when the negation optimization is enabled. This is due to the fact in
addition the negated operationProperty denitions are present in the program.
The results for the analysis times are similar to the ones for the load times. For SWIProlog
the timings are presented in Figure 8.23 and for ECLiPSe in Figure 8.24. Again, the results
of JIProlog are the same as the ones of SWIProlog with the exception of one outlier. We
assume that this outlier is caused by a garbage collection.
For ECLiPSe the analysis times are nearly constant independently of the enabled op-
timizations. For SWIProlog and JIProlog the analysis time grows linearly. Hereby, the
times are slightly worse when the negation optimization is enabled. For SWIProlog we
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Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.999)
Figure 8.22.: Load time of ECLiPSe measured for the scaling with the number of properties
(RQ-2.5).
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Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.999)
Figure 8.23.: Analysis time of SWIProlog measured for the scaling with the number of
properties (RQ-2.5).
can again assume that the growth is caused by the just-in-time indexing performed by the
interpreter.
8.3.2.6. Eectiveness of the indexing optimization (RQ-2.6)
The results of RQ-2.1 and RQ-2.2 already indicated the positive eect of the indexing
optimization on the analysis time. With the experiment design for RQ-2.6 we aimed to
show the best case of the rst-argument indexing by using a specialized model.
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Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=-0.454)
Figure 8.24.: Analysis time of ECLiPSe measured for the scaling with the number of prop-
erties (RQ-2.5).





















Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.998)
Figure 8.25.: Analysis time of ECLiPSe measured for the rst argument indexing optimiza-
tion performance experiment (RQ-2.6).
As expected, the translation time and the load times show no dierence to the obser-
vation we made in the experiments for RQ-2.1 and RQ-2.2. For this reason, we solely
focus on the analysis time in this section. The analysis times of ECLiPSe are shown in
Figure 8.25 and of SWIProlog in Figure 8.26. The plot for JIProlog has been omitted as the
growth of the analysis time are the same as for ECLiPSe.
For all three interpreters we can observe a quadratic growth of the analysis time when
the indexing optimization is not enabled. When it is enabled, we can see a very low linear,
near constant growth for JIProlog and ECLiPSe at least for the observed model sizes. For
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Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.979)
Figure 8.26.: Analysis time of SWIProlog measured for the rst argument indexing opti-
mization performance experiment (RQ-2.6).
SWIProlog the growth seems to be quadratic, but with a very low quadratic factor. These
are exactly the results we expect to see based on our hypothesis that the interpreters are
unable to use rst-argument indexing on the callArgument and returnValue predicates
when the indexing optimization is disabled. Hereby, a linear scaling is possible because with
perfect indexing the lookup of a single callArgument or returnValue is algorithmically
possible in O(1). As the proof for the model requires a linear number of such lookups, a
total analysis time in O(n) therefore is possible. For SWIProlog we can explain the still
quadratic growth again by just-in-time indexing: As the indexing possibly requires O(n)
time, the overall scaling can be quadratic. However, as shown by our measurement the
analysis time is still greatly reduced in comparison to when the indexing optimization is
disabled.
An unexpected observation is the fact that the assignments optimization also has
a positive impact on the analysis time. Even though the used datatype in the model
has only two attribute-value combinations, the assignments optimization improves the
performance for SWIProlog. This means that the assignments optimization only reduces
the total number of rules by a factor of about two. However, this reduction of the size of
the fact base already seems to have an positive impact on the performance. For ECLiPSe
and JIProlog only a minor improvement can be seen.
8.3.2.7. Eectiveness of the negation optimization (RQ-2.7)
For the negation optimization the experiments have only shown a negative impact of this
optimization so far. In almost all experiments, the translation and load time has increased
by a factor slightly less than two. The analysis time has mostly been unaected.
The reason for this bad performance of the negation optimization is that it is designed for
a scenario which is not present in the TravelPlanner example. For the negation optimization
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to become eective it is required that proofs for negated terms can be found faster than it
is possible to try out every existing call sequence. For this reason we designed the still
practically relevant model for the experiment of RQ-2.7 as explained in Section 8.3.2. This
model illustrates-the best case where the number of call sequences grows whereas the
actual complexity of the proof remains constant.
Just like the experiments for RQ-2.6 the translation time and the load time can be
observed to grow linearly. Hereby, the timings are slower by factor of up to two when the
negation optimization is enabled.






















Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.827)
Figure 8.27.: Analysis time of SWIProlog measured for the negation optimization experi-
ment (RQ-2.7).
The eectiveness of the negation optimization is illustrated by the analysis time shown
in Figure 8.27. In the gure the timings are shown for SWIProlog, however the observed
timings are the same for ECLiPSe and JIProlog with dierent constant factors. When the
negation optimization is enabled, the analysis time remains constant at a near zero level.
However, when it is disabled the time grows exponentially.
This therefore veries our hypothesis from Section 8.3.2. Without the optimization, the
interpreter has to try every call path in order to proof a negation. With the optimizations
enabled, negations can be used freely with only a constant impact on the translation and
load time of the resulting program. In this case, the analysis time does not get negatively
aected by the use of negations.
8.3.2.8. Eectiveness of the cut-based assignments optimization (RQ-2.8)
In order to answer RQ-2.8 we use the results of the experiments for RQ-2.4. The cut-
based assignments optimization targets scenarios where the number of attribute-value
combinations is higher than the number of assignments. In these cases, we expect to see
an improved load and translation time due to the decreased number of rule denitions.
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In the experiments for RQ-2.4 we clearly observed these benets. As shown in Fig-
ure 8.16 the assignments optimization causes the translation time to stay nearly constant.
The same results can be observed regarding the load time: As shown in Figure 8.17 and
Figure 8.18 the load time also remains constant when the assignments optimization is
enabled.
An unexpected benet of the assignments optimization is that we observed an improved
analysis time for SWIProlog and JIProlog. We expected that the total number of rule
denitions would not aect the analysis time due to the presence of rst-argument indexing.
However, for both SWIProlog and JIProlog the optimization caused the analysis time to
stay constant whereas without the optimization it grows linear. For SWIProlog this is
shown in Figure 8.19.
In the experiments for RQ-2.4 we observed the best case for the assignments optimiza-
tion. However, the results for other experiments, for example for RQ-2.1 showed that even
in other scenarios this optimization provides performance gains. As shown in Figure 8.6
the best load time was observed when only the assignments optimization is enabled. In
contrast to the results for RQ-2.4 the overall scalability is not aected, instead the timings
are just improved by a constant factor.
In general it is possible to deduce from the experiment results that the assignments
optimization is an optimization with no downsides performance wise. We observed no
metrics where enabling the optimization caused a decreased performance.
8.3.3. G3 - Genericness
In Section 8.2.4 we identied three additional scenario types for which our approach
should be applicable. For each scenario type we identied key characteristics which should
be covered by our meta model and analysis. In this section we therefore answer RQ-3.1,
RQ-3.2 and RQ-3.3 by explaining how these key characteristics can be modeled and
analysed using our approach.
8.3.3.1. Information Flow Constraints (RQ-2.8)
To answer RQ-2.8 we exemplary show how the key features of the Bell-La-Padula model
can be modeled and analysed using our approach. First of all, the Bell-La-Padula model
provides access control similar to our scenario presented in Section 3.1. A core dierence
is that the access control does not work role based but based on classication levels. For
example the ordered set of classication levels could be public, secret and topsecret. These
could be realized as a ValueSetType. This means that a datum which is for example classied
as secret may only be accessed by a user who has the access level secret or topsecret. This
implies that a comparison operator needs to be implemented for the classication levels.
As the number of levels is nite, this comparison can be realized as a boolean function
and therefore using our LogicTerms.
The second part of the model is fundamentally dierent from the access control model
we presented in Section 3.1: the information ow control. This means that when a user
has read highly classied data, he is not allowed to write to lower classied data anymore.
In order to implement this, we rst need a way of explicitly specifying when data is
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read and written. For this purpose two operations can be dened: read(data: Data) and
write(data : Data). Whenever now any operation semantically reads or writes a datum, the
corresponding operation calls these operations. The Data data type hereby only contains
the classication level of the datum. The model needs the ability to remember the highest
classication level of the data a user previously read. When assuming that we are in a
single user scenario, this can be done using a state variable. The read operation denes
a state variable userState : State. Hereby State has only a single attribute which stores
the highest classication level of previously read data. The read operation now has to
dene post execution state changes where userState is updated. This update is again just a
boolean function which can be realized via our LogicTerms.
With this infrastructure, the formulation of the analysis is straightforward: We look for
a call sequence to write(data : Data), where the given datum is lower classied than the
level stored in the userState variable. For the comparison we can reuse the same boolean
function as for the access control.
In this model we assumed a single-user scenario. If multiple users are present, the user
state cannot be realized as a state variable but instead has to be a parameter of the read
and write operations.
8.3.3.2. Data Flow Secrecy and Integrity (RQ-3.2)
To answer RQ-3.2 we show how to ensure the secrecy and integrity of owing data. Hereby
the goal is to ensure that these properties are present for each ow. The goal is not to show
that a given encryption or signature algorithm is secure. We model three approaches for
achieving these properties on a high level: encryption, digital signatures and physically
secure links.
The modeling of encryption and digital signatures is trivial. In the most simple case
we can just add the boolean attributes isEncrypted and isSigned to every datum. If these
attributes are set to true, the datum is assumed to be encrypted and signed correspondingly.
This simple modeling can also be expanded if multiple parties and therefore public-key
cryptography is involved. In this case a ValueSetType is required for modeling the identity
of the parties. The parties can be identied based on their public keys. Therefore the
ValueSetType is dened as partyIds = {pk1,pk2, . . . ,pki}. We can now use this type as type
for the attributes isEncrypted and isSigned. The meaning for isEncrypted is now changed
that the datum has been encrypted with the selected public keys. Similarly the value of
isSigned now states with which public keys the signature can be veried. To model the
identity of operations a property can be added which lists the public keys to which the
operation knows the private keys.
The modeling of a physically secure link is more complex. The link of data ow is
implicitly represented in our model by the OperationCalls. However, in our model it is
not possible to add properties to OperationCalls which makes it impossible to distinguish
between secure and unsecure links. This issue can be overcome by modeling the links
as operations instead. Similar to the inserted mediator operation used in Section 8.2.1
an intermediate operation is placed in every call. These operations represent links and
therefore just pass their call arguments through. In order to distinguish between links and
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normal operations in the analysis a property is required to identify these link operations.
In addition a property is required for specifying whether the link is secure or unsecure.
With this modeling the analysis to ensure secrecy and integrity is now trivial. For every
hop a datum takes it either has to be encrypted or the hop must be across a secure link for
secrecy to be achieved. Therefore (a) the isEncrypted attribute of the datum has to be set
accordingly or (b) either the source or the receiver of the ow must be a link operation
which is secure. For integrity the analysis looks the same: (a) the isSigned attribute of the
datum has to be set accordingly or (b) either the source or the receiver of the ow must be
a link operation which is secure.
8.3.3.3. Data Life Cycle Management (RQ-3.3)
For answering RQ-3.3 we focus exemplary on one critical part of the life cycle of data: the
deletion.
First of all it is required to model the allowed lifetime for the data. This can be done
by adding an attribute to the data whose ValueSetType species the lifetime. For example
possible values for the lifetime attribute could be processingOnly, sessionPersistence and
longTermPersistence. The classes required have to be identied based on the concrete
system which is being modeled.
The second part that has to be modeled is how the data is used persistence wise.
Therefore we add a property named persistenceType to every operation. As ValueSetType
we use the same type as for the lifetime attribute. However, the semantic is a little dierent:
The property now states how every incoming datum is persisted: does the operation only
process the data and not persist it at all or is it a database persisting the data for a long
time? Note that we require that this persistence level is the same for every incoming
datum. This strict requirement is needed for the analysis. How can operations be modeled
which have multiple persistence levels? For example what about a servlet which (a) only
processes some data and (b) stores some data for the time of the session? Such operations
have to be split into multiple operations. In our example the operation can be split in a
Servlet operation and a ServletStorage operation. The Servlet operation has processingOnly
as persistenceType whereas ServletStorage has sessionPersistence. Servlet now receives all
the data but only delegates the data to be persisted to ServletStorage.
The strict requirement that persistenceType species the persistence for every incoming
datum makes it possible to formulate the analysis. We can now simply compare the lifetime
attribute of all parameters with the persistenceType property for every operation. This
comparison can be written as a propositional logic formula as the number of combinations
is nite.
8.3.4. Summary
With our evaluation goals G1, G2 and G3 we aimed to show that our approach is accurate,
scalable and also applicable to additional scenarios.
For G1 the evaluation showed that our approach accurately detects constraint violations
for our access control and geolocation restrictions scenario presented in Chapter 3. Hereby
in all tried models all violations have been found without any false positives. As we
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employed the call graph randomization technique (Section 8.2.1) for generating the model
instances we can state that the ndings are independent of the topological structure of the
model.
We analysed scalability of our approach (G2) regarding two main aspects: (a) the scal-
ability with the size of the input system model and (b) the impact of our implemented
performance optimizations. The results showed that at worst our approach scales quadrat-
ically with the size of the input model. However, in most cases with our optimizations
enabled the performance scaled either linearly or only with a very low quadratic compo-
nent. We also observed that the rst argument indexing and the cut based assignments
optimizations never reduced the performance by a signicant factor and can therefore be
always enabled. The logical negation optimization comes at the cost of a higher constant
factor regarding the load time of the model, it however potentially reduces the analysis
time from exponential to constant scaling.
As a side eect we discovered that the absolute run time highly depends on the chosen
Prolog implementation. In most experiments ECLiPSe is the fastest at analysing but has a
longer load time. SWIProlog is slightly slower performing the analysis but has a much
lower loading time. For JIProlog the loading times are similar, however the analysis times
we observed usually are slower by a factor of about 50 to 100.
To answer G3 we selected three additional scenario types and evaluated how well they
can be modeled with our approach. The scenarios we selected are information ow control,
secrecy and integrity enforcement and data lifecycle management. For all three we showed
that it is possible to model scenarios in these domains using the features our model and
analysis API oer. However, the modeling often required special tweaks, such as the
modeling of physically secure links using additional operations.
8.4. Threats to Validity
In this section we briey discuss the threats to the validity of our evaluation. Hereby
we apply the classication scheme for threats to validity proposed by Runeson et al. [24,
Section 5.4].
Threats to internal validity are threats where factors the researcher is unaware of
possibly inuence the results. If such threats are present it is questionable that the
experiments actually can be used for answering the research questions. For our evaluation
of the accuracy (G1) we only used two base models for the evaluation: one for the access
control scenario and one for the geolocation based restrictions scenario. Therefore a
potential internal threat is that not all features of our approach are covered by these models.
As we already mentioned in Section 8.2.2 our analyses only examine call arguments, which
can depend on return values in our used models. State models have not been used as they
were added later to our approach. However, as explained in Section 5.2, state variables are
eectively realized using the same techniques as parameters and return values. In addition
even though our analyses do not directly reference return values, the models have call
arguments which depend on return values. For this reason return values are also covered
by our evaluation. Because our evaluation shows that parameters and return values work
accurately, we assume that with a high probability there are no conceptual issues with
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state variables either. However, we cannot exclude implementation errors at this point.
For this reason it would be benecial to evaluate return values and state variables through
additional experiments in future work.
For the scalability evaluation (G2) we considered three inuence factors in our exper-
iment design: The size of the model in multiple dimensions, the enabled performance
optimizations as well as the used Prolog implementation. Hereby, a minor threat we see
is the possibility that we missed out an important dimension of the model. However, as
we chose the dimensions to scale the model instances based on the structure of the meta
model as well as the translation process, we classify this as a minor threat.
An additional threat to internal validity can be identied regarding the evaluation of the
genericness (G3) of our approach. To evaluate the genericness, we identied additional
scenario types and explained how their key characteristics can be modeled using the
features of our approach. A possible threat is the fact that we might have missed some
important features of these scenario types. However, as the features we identied are
sucient for building functional models, we therefore assume that we covered at least the
most important ones. Regarding that the focus of our work lies on the scalability of our
approach, we therefore consider this a minor threat.
Threats to the external validity of our evaluation impact how well our ndings can be
generalized. For the experiments regarding accuracy a threat is induced by the fact that we
investigated only two specic model instances. However, both models have been designed
to cover the important aspects of the scenarios they target. In addition, we employed
the call graph randomization technique (Section 8.2.1) during our analysis. Whilst this
technique does not fully randomize the model, at least the topological structure of the
callgraph is randomized.
For the analysis of the scalability there is always the threat that the chosen input sizes
are to small to uncover the actual scalability. As we executed very many experiments,
we had to keep the per experiment run time low for practical reasons. However, we can
assume that the size of the model instances we analysed is big enough in comparison to the
model size we would expect in a real world usage of our approach at least for small systems.
The models we used as input for the scalability experiments are up to 200 times the size
of the base TravelPlanner model presented in Section 5.7.1. Still when all optimizations
are enabled we observed very low run times in many experiments. In these cases more
measurements with larger models as future work are required to fully answer the question
of the scalability.
The external validity of the genericness evaluation is threatened by the fact that we did
not explicitly build example model instances, but instead only showed how key concepts
of the scenario types can be realized. Therefore no experimental proof is given that this
realization works. Nevertheless, we showed the functional correctness of most of the
features our approach provides experimentally through (G1). As the realization of the key
concepts of the scenario types we presented using these features is straight forward, we
can assume that this threat is minor.
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8.5. Assumptions and Limitations
During the design and implementation of our approach we made several assumptions and
design decisions which in turn induce limitations. In this section we briey discuss these
assumptions and limitations.
One central assumption we made during the design of our meta model is that we assume
that all variables of the system can be expressed as boolean values via ValueSetTypes. This
assumption was made as these types of variables are sucient for our two main scenarios,
access control and geolocation based restrictions. Therefore this allowed us to provide a
working implementation of our meta-model and the Prolog translator despite the limited
time available for the thesis. Note that this limitation is not induced by Prolog: as Prolog
is a constraint programming language it has built-in support for numeric values and
constraints. Therefore a future extension of our approach to support numeric variables
should be possible. In addition in theory our approach as-is is capable of representing
numeric values at a xed range. Numeric values can be represented in their binary form
using multiple boolean variables. The arithmetic in turn has to be expressed via boolean
equations. However, in practice this approach can be expected to be too cumbersome and
slow to be useable.
The second central assumption we made during our meta model specication is the
fact that we assume that operations are essentially stateless. While we introduced state
variables for modeling state within the execution of a single SystemUsage state variables
are not persisted across the execution of SystemUsage. This means that in our model no
long-term persistence outlasting a single usage execution exists. However, we expect that
this assumption does not severely limit the applicability of our approach. Depending on
the scenario, restrictions regarding data persistence can be modeled with other means. An
example for such a ways of modeling persistence restrictions is given with RQ-3.3.
Another important assumption we made is that we can express every kind of operation
using our proposed LogicTerms. Due to the fact that we assumed that all in- and output
variables of operations are boolean we can show that this assumption does not induce any
limitation regarding the expressiveness. Given any set of input variable conguration, it
is possible to dene the desired output variables based on truth tables. These truth tables
can be expressed using boolean formulas, for example by using the disjunctive or the
conjunctive normal form. As we have modeled And, Or and Not as LogicTerms, we can
express these formulas in our model.
A limitation of a more practical nature is the fact that our model is not as expressive
as Prolog which is used for the analysis. In certain cases it might not be possible to
express additional required information using our meta model, where code in addition to
the analysis has to be added manually. An example for such a case is our example shop
scenario for geolocation based restrictions. There, the classication whether a geolocation
is considered safe or unsafe was manually added using the analysis prolog code. We
however assume that this limitation is not severe because (a) every model element can be
easily referenced and therefore annotated based on its name and (b) additional code has to




To conclude this thesis, we briey summarize our approach and the ndings of our
evaluation in Section 9.1. Finally, we outline possible enhancements we see as future work
in Section 9.2.
9.1. Summary
The goal of this thesis was to provide an ecient model based approach for analyzing
software systems regarding data ow constraints on architecture level. To achieve this we
designed a specialized meta-model for modeling data ows within systems. In addition we
dened a Prolog translator which allows the translation of model instances of our meta
model to Prolog programs. The resulting Prolog programs expose the data ows and the
structure of the modeled system through a specialized API. Based on this API, it is possible
to formulate queries for uncovering data ow constraint violations. For the design of our
approach we focused on two main application scenario: access control and geolocation
based privacy restrictions.
The central idea we based our meta-model on is the modeling of data based on its
meta-attributes. Representing such meta-attributes using sets of boolean variables allowed
us to model data manipulation using boolean algebra. This approach enables us to dene
data manipulation through Operations in our model with a high degree of exibility. In
addition we allowed Operations to interact with each other, allowing a decomposition to
closely match the underlying modeled system.
To allow an automated analysis for data ow constraint violations we provided a
translator transforming instances of our meta-model to Prolog programs. These programs
can be queried for violations using our proposed API. During the design of the translator
we introduced new fundamental concepts, for example the representation of system call
stack traces using Prolog lists. With the combination of these concepts and our API it is
now possible to easily formulate various types of data ow constraint queries.
In addition a central aspect of this thesis was the scalability of our approach. For this
reason we designed and evaluated three dierent optimizations of the generated Prolog
code: The ecient usage of rst-argument indexing, an implementation of ecient logical
negations and a reduction of the number of required rules based on the Prolog cut predicate.
The concepts these optimizations are based on are not limited to our work. They are
potentially also applicable to other Prolog based approaches.
We evaluated our approach regarding its accuracy, scalability and genericness. For
the accuracy we showed that our approach is able to express and analyse our example
scenarios for access control and geolocation based restrictions. For the scalability we
showed that the translation as well as the analysis scale well with the size of the input.
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In addition we showed that our proposed performance optimizations provide signicant
gains in most of the investigated cases. In some cases we were able to reduce the runtime
of the analysis from exponential to constant time. To show the genericness we discussed
how additional types of scenarios can be expressed and analysed using our approach.
9.2. Future Work
While our approach is functional as-is, we still discovered several aspects which could be
addressed as future work.
Add support for numeric variables Currently our meta-model models all variables as sets
of boolean variables. While this variable type has shown to be sucient for the scenarios
we focused on, we assume that it is likely that other types of scenarios require numeric
variables. The addition of a numeric type is especially feasible because Prolog has built-in
support for numeric values. In order to support numeric types, another type has to be
added beside the existing ValueSetType. In addition, custom term types have to be added
for expressing arithmetic terms and constraints.
Realization of a translation from Data-Centric Palladio to our approach Our approach has
been designed for expressing data ow systems so that they can be analysed automatically.
For this reason, the manual denition of model instances can easily become cumbersome.
Therefore, it is desirable to implement additional model transformations to bridge this
gap. For example, Data-Centric Palladio oers an intuitive way for users to dene the
data ows of a system. However, currently its automated analysis capabilities are limited.
Therefore it would be desirable to have a translation to the meta-model of our approach
to enable an automated analysis in combination with an easy model denition.
Evaluation of our approach with additional scenarios During the design of our approach
we focused on two main scenario types: access control and geolocation based restrictions.
However as we tried to keep our approach as generic as possible during the design, we
assume that it also can be applied to other scenario types. Supporting this assumption we
provided a discussion based evaluation where we showed our approach potentially can be
applied to other scenarios. However it would be desirable to have concrete system models
and analysis for such additional scenario types to validate the genericness of our approach.
In addition our choice of models did not directly cover all features of our approach, such
as state variables. Therefore it is desirable to have an additional accuracy evaluation with
models which cover these features.
Improve thescalabilityof thePrologTranslator implementation In the evaluation we found
out that in certain scenarios our Prolog Translator scales quadratic (e.g. see Figure 8.5).
However, according to our denition of the translation process in Chapter 6 it should be
possible to implement the translator with a linear scalability. While the impact is minor
due to the low total run time of the translator, this fact still shows that there is optimization
potential for the implementation.
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Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=1.000)
Figure A.1.: Load time of JIProlog measured for the scaling with the number of operations
(RQ-2.1).



















Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.997)

























Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.997)
Figure A.3.: Analysis time of SWIProlog measured for the scaling with the number of
operations (RQ-2.1).



















Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.996)
Figure A.4.: Total time of ECLiPSe measured for the scaling with the number of operations
(RQ-2.1).






















Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.999)
Figure A.5.: Total time of JIProlog measured for the scaling with the number of operations
(RQ-2.1).
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Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.996)
Figure A.6.: Total time of SWIProlog measured for the scaling with the number of opera-
tions (RQ-2.1).























Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.990)
Figure A.7.: Translation time measured for the scaling with the complexity of the call
graph (RQ-2.2).


















Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.999)

























Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.997)
Figure A.9.: Load time of SWIProlog measured for the scaling with the complexity of the
call graph (RQ-2.2).





















Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.996)
Figure A.10.: Analysis time of ECLiPSe measured for the scaling with the complexity of
the call graph (RQ-2.2).






















Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.993)
Figure A.11.: Analysis time of SWIProlog measured for the scaling with the complexity of
the call graph (RQ-2.2).
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Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.995)
Figure A.12.: Total time of ECLiPSe measured for the scaling with the complexity of the
call graph (RQ-2.2).




















Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.999)
Figure A.13.: Total time of JIProlog measured for the scaling with the complexity of the
call graph (RQ-2.2).


















Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.997)
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Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=1.000)
Figure A.15.: Load time of JIProlog measured for the scaling with the number of parameters
and return values (RQ-2.3).
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Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=1.000)
Figure A.16.: Load time of SWIProlog measured for the scaling with the number of param-
eters and return values (RQ-2.3).
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Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.969)
Figure A.17.: Analysis time of JIProlog measured for the scaling with the number of pa-
rameters and return values (RQ-2.3).
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Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.996)
Figure A.18.: Total time of ECLiPSe measured for the scaling with the number of parameters
and return values (RQ-2.3).
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Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.999)
Figure A.19.: Total time of JIProlog measured for the scaling with the number of parameters
and return values (RQ-2.3).
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Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=1.000)
Figure A.20.: Total time of SWIProlog measured for the scaling with the number of param-
eters and return values (RQ-2.3).
119
A. Appendix
250 500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000



















Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=1.000)
Figure A.21.: Load time of SWIProlog measured for the scaling with the number of attribute-
value combinations (RQ-2.4).
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Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.410)
Figure A.22.: Analysis time of JIProlog measured for the scaling with the number of
attribute-value combinations (RQ-2.4).
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Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.994)
Figure A.23.: Total time of ECLiPSe measured for the scaling with the number of attribute-
value combinations (RQ-2.4).
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Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.998)
Figure A.24.: Total time of JIProlog measured for the scaling with the number of attribute-
value combinations (RQ-2.4).
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Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.963)
Figure A.25.: Total time of SWIProlog measured for the scaling with the number of
attribute-value combinations (RQ-2.4).
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Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=1.000)
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Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=1.000)
Figure A.27.: Load time of SWIProlog measured for the scaling with the number of prop-
erties (RQ-2.5).
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Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.999)
Figure A.28.: Analysis time of JIProlog measured for the scaling with the number of prop-
erties (RQ-2.5).
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Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.999)
Figure A.29.: Total time of ECLiPSe measured for the scaling with the number of properties
(RQ-2.5).
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Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=1.000)
Figure A.30.: Total time of JIProlog measured for the scaling with the number of properties
(RQ-2.5).
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Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.998)
Figure A.31.: Total time of SWIProlog measured for the scaling with the number of prop-
erties (RQ-2.5).
























Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.987)






















Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.990)
Figure A.33.: Load time of ECLiPSe measured for the rst argument indexing optimization
performance experiment (RQ-2.6).






















Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=1.000)
Figure A.34.: Load time of JIProlog measured for the rst argument indexing optimization
performance experiment (RQ-2.6).



















Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.995)
Figure A.35.: Load time of SWIProlog measured for the rst argument indexing optimiza-
tion performance experiment (RQ-2.6).
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Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.991)
Figure A.36.: Analysis time of JIProlog measured for the rst argument indexing optimiza-
tion performance experiment (RQ-2.6).


















Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.990)
Figure A.37.: Total time of ECLiPSe measured for the rst argument indexing optimization
performance experiment (RQ-2.6).



















Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=1.000)























Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.995)
Figure A.39.: Total time of SWIProlog measured for the rst argument indexing optimiza-
tion performance experiment (RQ-2.6).






















Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.970)
Figure A.40.: Translation time measured for the negation optimization experiment (RQ-
2.7).




















Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.999)
Figure A.41.: Load time of ECLiPSe measured for the negation optimization experiment
(RQ-2.7).
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Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=1.000)
Figure A.42.: Load time of JIProlog measured for the negation optimization experiment
(RQ-2.7).



















Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.999)
Figure A.43.: Load time of SWIProlog measured for the negation optimization experiment
(RQ-2.7).





















Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.358)


























Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.835)
Figure A.45.: Analysis time of JIProlog measured for the negation optimization experiment
(RQ-2.7).


















Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.999)
Figure A.46.: Total time of ECLiPSe measured for the negation optimization experiment
(RQ-2.7).




















Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=1.000)
Figure A.47.: Total time of JIProlog measured for the negation optimization experiment
(RQ-2.7).
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Negation, Indexing and Cut-Assignment optimizations (r=0.999)
Figure A.48.: Total time of SWIProlog measured for the negation optimization experiment
(RQ-2.7).
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